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This study of the influence of Charles Darwin on Thomas Hardy's tragic novels 
centers on two key concepts in the work of Darwin. The first is Darwin's narrative of the 
evolution of morality, which describes moral decisions as a struggle for survival between 
various instincts, habits, and customs, both within the individual and within society as a 
whole. Of particular importance is the role of reason and sympathy in overcoming base 
and selfish instincts. The second is the idea, introduced in Origin, that the work of 
scientific breeders represents an act of Conscious Selection, a separate form of evolution  
in which human ingenuity deliberately changes the course of Natural Selection to create 
new varieties and species.
Applying these ideas to Return of the Native, Tess of the d'Urbervilles, and Jude 
the Obscure, I argue that all three novels essentially follow the same Darwinian arc: an 
individual who demonstrates the next stage in intellectual and emotional development 
required for the advancement of morality is introduced into an unsympathetic society. 
The conflict of the novels proceeds from the struggles, both within the individual and 
between the individual and the larger society, for the survival of those traits. The tragic 
outcomes of the novels are rooted in the fact that Hardy places those new traits in 
opposition to more traditional instincts and customs, driving them to extinction either 
through the death of the protagonist or through an atavistic return to more traditional 
values on the part of the protagonist. These tragic endings are meant to engage the 
sympathies of the reader while also appealing to their reason through the dissection of 
those internal and external forces that overcome the protagonists’ new views. In this way, 
Hardy applies the principles outlined in Origin and Descent to a project of moral 
husbandry first suggested by Darwin.
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1Chapter One
Eminent Breeder of the Immanent 
In days when men found joy in war,
A God of Battles sped each mortal jar;
The peoples pledged him heart and hand,
From Israel's land to isles afar.
…
That modern meditation broke
His spell, that penman's pleadings dealt a stroke,
Say some; and some that crimes too dire
Did much to mire his crimson cloak.
-Thomas Hardy, “The Sick Battle-God”1
Thomas Hardy’s poem “Drinking Song,” published in his final collection of 
poetry, begins with a description of Thales’ assumption that, as Hardy puts it, “everything 
was made for man” (Poems, 905). From that point, Hardy proceeds with a catalog of the 
scientific developments that have unsettled all of Thales’ assumptions, moving from 
Copernicus to Hume, Darwin, and Cheyne, finally arriving at the work of Einstein:
And now comes Einstein with a notion—
       Not yet quite clear
       To many here—
That’s there’s no time, no space, no motion,
2       Nor rathe nor late,
       Nor square nor straight,
But just a sort of bending ocean (Poems, 907).
The poem’s subject should come as no surprise to any reader of Hardy; the role of 
scientific theories in Hardy’s writing has long been a subject of critical discussion. But 
there is a crucial idea embedded in these lines. Hardy’s description of the “bending 
ocean” posited by Einstein, written in the 1920’s, reminds us that Hardy was an avid, 
engaged reader of scientific literature, interested in exploring the specific ideas of 
thinkers like Einstein and teasing out their implications for society.
This is especially important for critics attempting to approach the influence of 
Darwin on Hardy, a subject that has been treated in a variety of ways. Overlooked in 
these treatments, however, is a Darwinian narrative which frames Hardy’s fictional 
world, in which tragedy exists but is not informed by pessimism or despair. Closer 
scrutiny reveals a scientifically-informed hope that the fate of society could be 
deliberately changed for the better. Darwin’s ideas provided Hardy with a framework for 
understanding human morality, how it developed by natural selection, and how it could 
be influenced by carefully crafted fiction.
Pessimism and Darwinism are two concepts that any critic approaching Hardy’s 
philosophical thought must understand. The two are so inextricably linked in many 
readings of Hardy that any mention of one concept seems to necessitate a mention of the 
other. The easiest way of linking the two is to argue that a young Hardy, after reading the 
work of Charles Darwin, despaired at the idea of a universe run not by a benevolent 
3creator but by a series of brutal, unguided physical processes. Crushed by the absence of 
God, the argument continues, Hardy put his characters at the mercy of an unfeeling 
Nature whose only logic was survival of the fittest. In this reading, Hardy's novels are 
reduced to an expression of his disillusionment at the discovery that life is, at best, a 
pitiful, meaningless struggle to find some temporary happiness in the face of a growing 
certainty that there would be no life to come, no reward for suffering.
This deterministic reading gains some traction when measured by the plots of 
Hardy’s later novels. Beginning especially with The Return of the Native, Hardy’s novels 
became increasingly dark; from the drowning of Eustacia Vye to the terrible murder-
suicide of Jude Fawley’s children, Hardy’s work was increasingly filled with unrequited 
love, unhappy marriages, death, murder, and even suicide. And there can be no doubt that
circumstance often appears at first glance to play a large part in the development of these 
tragedies; it is the accidental slumber of Tess Durbeyfield, for instance, that seems to 
bring about the death of her family’s horse and the inevitable downward spiral of her own 
life that results. 
This reading depends on an understanding of Darwinian ideas as fundamentally 
pessimistic, an understanding that confuses the cultural response to Darwin with the 
substance of his ideas. It further relies on the assumption that Hardy’s fatalism is 
absolute, that his pessimism is never compromised. Hardy, however, consistently asserted 
that both claims were false. Seizing on this, a number of critics have written on the 
elements of Hardy’s fiction that support his resistance to the label “pessimist.” Yet, as 
Roy Morrell asserts in his treatment of The Dynasts, “It may be that when we recall 
4Hardy’s novels, a deterministic interpretation can be made to seem plausible; but it is 
very different when we read or reread them”(24). 
An alternative to the idea of Hardy as a Darwinian pessimist is revealed if, like 
Hardy, we carefully examine the details of Darwin's writing. The strictly pessimistic 
reading makes of evolution a bogeyman for theology, as opposed to what Hardy saw it to 
be: a scientific theory that not only explained the origin and nature of human 
consciousness and morality but also described the way in which humanity could perfect 
its moral system and extend the benefits of that system to all living creatures. This 
potential power of sympathy in Darwin's work is the basis of Hardy’s hope for the 
possibility of a more perfect concept of justice and equality in the world. 
More recently, critics have offered a number of readings of Hardy’s work that 
engage more directly with the substance of Darwin's ideas. One school of Darwinian 
reading is exemplified by Peter Morton’s “Tess of the D’Urbervilles, a Neo-Darwinian 
Reading.” Morton seizes on the idea of hereditary transmission in Darwin, arguing that 
Hardy’s tragedy is motivated by hereditary determinism. Another line of argument has 
been extended by Roger Robinson, who, working from passages in Hardy’s personal 
writing, focuses on his claim that emotions and morality are an evolutionary blunder, a 
sensitivity that can only leave mankind pained and unhappy. Both authors suggest a 
profoundly pessimistic reading of both Hardy and Darwin.2
In outlining Hardy’s response to the works of Darwin, Robinson declares that 
Hardy “eschewed, contemptuously …the palliative ‘contortions’ and compromises with 
conventional Victorian religion or conventional Victorian progressivism,” never losing 
5sight of “his deep initial belief in the absolute truthfulness and fundamental hopelessness 
of Darwin’s ideas” (128). Robinson sums up his idea of the “fundamental hopelessness” 
inspired by evolutionary theory in his reading of the famous final lines of Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles. Responding to Hardy’s Aeschylean allusions and the idea that Tess had 
been toyed with by some unseen “President of the Immortals” (422), Robinson remarks 
that
It is pointless to object that the novel’s view has not been Aeschylean. Of 
course it hasn’t. But the novelist’s recourse to such an explanation, 
illogically and inconsistently, at the moment of deepest grief and pity, adds 
a further level of response to his work. We are as moved by Hardy’s pity, 
by his need to invent a malicious God, as by Tess’s plight (148).
The problem with this reading of Tess is that it ignores the irony with which Hardy’s 
narrator views Tess’ fate. This reading limits the function of the narrator to one who 
relates the unfolding of events, without a deeper understanding or critical vision.  
Robinson supports this idea with his reading of the poem “Hap,” originally 
written in 1866 and collected in the 1898 volume Wessex Poems and Other Verses. The 
poem is an inevitable fixture in any pessimistic reading of Hardy’s work. In the poem, the 
speaker laments the lack of a “vengeful god” who could identify himself as the source of 
the speakers suffering (Poems, 9). Much to the narrator’s dismay, however, there is no 
such vengeful deity. Instead, he explains
Crass casualty obstructs the sun and rain, 
And dicing Time for gladness casts a moan….
6These purblind Doomsters had as readily strown
 Blisses about my pilgrimage as pain” (9).
Robinson is not alone in linking the desperation of “Hap” to the tragic mood of 
the novels. Rather, he is simply reiterating the commonplace view that the themes of 
Hardy’s work follow from the views of the narrator of “Hap” and that passages such as 
the final lines of Tess suggest nothing more than a despondency at an unjust world 
operated by chance alone, a despondency accompanied by a desperate wish for a 
scapegoat deity. But while such a view is well-supported by “Hap,” the idea becomes 
harder to support when applied to the rest of Hardy’s work, both in verse and prose. This 
difficulty suggests one possible logical error informing any purely pessimistic reading of 
Hardy: the assumption that “Hap,” a short early poem, best exemplifies the whole of 
Hardy’s worldview, despite the disparity between the ideas expressed in “Hap” and 
Hardy's more methodical attempts to describe his worldview in both public and private 
writing.
In his personal writings and correspondence, for example, Hardy repeatedly 
dismissed the search for a personal deity as outdated and unnecessary. In a letter first 
printed in Florence Hardy’s biographical work, The Later Years of Thomas Hardy, he 
responds to a similar criticism of the passage in Tess, saying that
[u]nder this species of criticism if an author were to say ‘Aeolus 
maliciously tugged at her garments, and tore her hair in his wrath’, the 
sapient critic would no doubt announce that author’s evil creed to be that 
the wind is ‘a powerful being endowed with the baser human passions’, 
7etc.,etc (4-5).
Hardy’s frustration with this line of argument extended beyond the basic claim that he 
was simply employing figurative language. In another letter printed in the same volume, 
he expresses his feelings about the effort to label him an atheist:
Much confusion has arisen and much nonsense has been talked latterly in 
connection with the word “atheist”. I have never understood how anybody 
can be one except in the sense of disbelieving in a tribal god, man-shaped, 
fiery-faced and tyrannous, who flies into a rage on the slightest 
provocation ... Fifty meanings attach to the word “God” nowadays, the 
only reasonable meaning being The Cause of Things, whatever that cause 
may be. Thus no modern thinker can be an atheist in the modern sense, 
while all modern thinkers are atheists in the ancient and exploded sense 
(176).
Hardy’s contention that all modern thinkers must have moved on from this “ancient and 
exploded” theology highlights the development of his philosophy since “Hap.” The 
speaker in the poem expresses his frustration at having no scapegoat deity on whom he 
could blame his troubles, no “vengeful God” to say “Thy love’s loss is my hate’s 
profiting” (Poems, 9). By the time Hardy gets around to the above definition of “atheist,” 
the “vengeful God” of “Hap,” who would certainly fit Hardy’s description of a “tribal” 
and “fiery-faced” god, has been rendered ridiculous.  Indeed, the very search for an 
identifiable deity now seems absurd to Hardy. In another journal entry, Hardy asserts that 
some questions “are made unimportant by their very magnitude,” among them such 
8questions as “whether we are moving in Space this way or that,” and “the existence of a 
God” (Later Years, 54). 
These notes definitely pose a challenge to the idea of Hardy’s career as an 
exercise in bleak pessimism. Furthermore, they suggest that the desolate frustration of the 
speaker in “Hap” is not the central feature of Hardy’s ideology so much as its starting 
point. In the poem, Hardy records the feelings of someone who has accepted an atheistic 
or agnostic position and is now struggling with the implications of that acceptance.  It 
seems believable that Hardy, writing the poem in 1866 at the age of twenty-six, was 
wrestling with the same angst as the poem’s speaker. Judging by Hardy’s later work, it 
seems less believable that he never progressed beyond that initial period of frustration 
and confusion.
One of Hardy’s most systematic attempts to outline his worldview was the 
“Apology” that served as preface to the 1922 verse collection, Late Lyrics and Earlier. In 
it he expresses a particular frustration with the use of the word “pessimism” as a 
descriptor for his work. He argues that the “disallowance of ‘obstinate questionings’ and 
‘blank misgivings’ tends to a paralysed[sic] intellectual stalemate,” and that what his 
detractors called pessimism was “only such ‘questionings in the explorations of reality,” 
questionings that were “the first step toward the soul’s betterment, and the body’s  
also”(Poems, 557).3 Hardy goes on to quote the line from his poem “In Tenebris”: “If a 
way to the Better there be, it exacts a full look at the Worst,” glossing the line by 
explaining that such an examination requires “the exploration of reality, and its frank 
recognition stage by stage along the survey, with an eye to the best consummation 
9possible: briefly, evolutionary meliorism” (557).
The concept of evolutionary meliorism is crucial to understanding Hardy's 
worldview. Robinson, for his part, lists “evolutionary meliorism” as one of a progression 
of worldviews which Hardy eventually “eschews contemptuously” while focusing on the 
“hopelessness” of Darwin’s ideas (128). Robinson’s implication that Hardy defied the 
optimism of evolutionary meliorism is particularly troublesome because the idea of 
evolutionary meliorism and the “full look at the Worst” are, by Hardy’s own estimation,  
central to his work. How, then, should these ideas be approached by critics? The best way
to do so seems to be obliquely, through an exploration of another central concept in 
Hardy’s work: the Immanent Will.
The Immanent Will appears in Hardy’s epic verse treatment of the Napoleonic 
Wars, The Dynasts, and it is the crystallization of the ideas that Hardy had been 
developing throughout his career. The Will is an unconscious, all-moving force, made up 
of the sum of the natural mechanisms that rule and constitute the universe and everything 
in it. This definition of “Will” differs in a fundamental way from familiar definitions used 
in philosophy. In The Dynasts, the Immanent Will does not represent the will of the 
individual, or even the collective will of society, although both forces do make up part of 
the total Will. Because it represents the effects of natural laws and processes as opposed 
to the efforts of an intelligent deity, spirit, or social collective, Hardy presents the Will as 
both unconscious and sexless. But it is important to note that the nature of the Immanent 
Will is not fixed. If it were, then The Dynasts would certainly support the pessimistic 
readings offered by many critics. A closer examination of the play, however, suggests a 
10
philosophy much more complex than the determinist narrative attributes to Hardy.
The Dynasts has two levels of narrative: the human narrative surrounding the 
political and military struggles of Europe and the philosophical narrative featuring the 
various spirits who observe and comment on those struggles. The central feature of the 
philosophical narrative is the debate between the venerable Spirit of the Years and the 
youthful Spirit of the Pities about the fate of humanity, a debate that is introduced in the 
“Fore Scene.” At the beginning of that scene, the Spirit of the Years provides a 
description of the Immanent Will, saying that
It works unconsciously, as heretofore,
Eternal artistries in Circumstance,
Whose patterns, wrought by rapt aesthetic rote,
Seem in themselves Its single listless aim,
And not their consequence (Dynasts, 1).
The Spirit of the Years’ observation is met with despair by the Spirit of the Pities:
Still thus? Still thus?
Ever unconscious?
An automatic sense
Unweeting why or whence?
Be, then, the inevitable as of old,
Although that So it be we dare not hold! (1).
This response echoes the feelings of the speaker in “Hap.” The Pities struggle to accept 
the idea of a universe governed by an “automatic sense” as opposed to a benevolent (or 
11
even malevolent) deity, refusing to accept the fatalistic implications of such a revelation. 
Ultimately refusing to accept the arguments made by the Spirit of the Years, the Spirit of 
the Pities argues in favor of a more just world shaped by the ennobling effects of 
sympathy. The final lines of the play, sung by the entire chorus of the Spirits, suggest the 
goal of the Spirit of the Pities:
That the rages
Of the ages
Shall be cancelled, and deliverance offered from the darts that were
Consciousness the Will informing, till It fashion all things fair! (525)
There are elements of the play that definitely suggest that in struggling to “fashion
all things fair,”  the Spirit of the Pities labors in vain for a naïve cause. If that were true, 
then it would be hard to disavow a pessimistic reading of The Dyansts, and of Hardy’s 
work in general. A closer examination of his personal writings suggests, however, that 
Hardy put a great deal of stock in the philosophy presented by the Spirit of the Pities, a 
philosophy that he himself had been developing throughout his career. As he explained to 
Howard Wright in a letter written just after  the publication of The Dynasts:
In a dramatic epic—which I may perhaps assume The Dynasts to be—
some philosophy of life was necessary, and I went on using that which I 
had denoted in my previous volumes of verse (and to some extent prose) 
as being a generalized form of what the thinking world had gradually 
come to adopt. That the Unconscious Will is growing aware of itself I 
believe I may claim as my own idea solely—at which I arrived by 
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reflecting that what has taken place in a fraction of the whole (i.e. so much 
of the world as has become conscious) is likely to take place in the mass; 
and there being no Will outside the mass—that is, the Universe—the 
whole Will becomes conscious thereby: and ultimately, it is to be hoped, 
sympathetic (Early Life, 124).
This letter is crucial to any understanding of Hardy’s worldview. In it, he explicitly states 
that the growing consciousness of the Will isn’t merely possible, it is happening. He 
further claims that his view squares, at least to some extent, with the ideas presented in 
his earlier prose and poetry. It is also worth noting that, as with his “modern” definition 
of atheism, Hardy saw his view of the developing consciousness of the Will to be an 
unavoidable conclusion that was being embraced by the “thinking world.”
The fact that the Spirit of the Pities, the main proponent of sympathy and 
understanding, is the character who extends Hardy’s argument within The Dynasts is also 
significant. Hardy’s early notes on The Dynasts suggest that he had always been 
particularly taken with the idea of humanity as an organism and that he was particularly 
interested in the biological development of human sympathy and morality. In an 1875 
note proposing a “Great Modern Drama,” Hardy writes of a desire to “[d]iscover for how 
many years, and on how many occasions, the organism, Society, has been standing, lying, 
etc., in varied positions, as if it were a tree or a man hit by vicissitudes” (Early Life,188). 
In another note he proposes “a history of human automatism, or impulsion—viz., an 
account of human action in spite of human knowledge, showing how very far conduct 
lags behind the knowledge that should really guide it,” (Early Life, 197-98). Perhaps most
13
telling is a note written in his journal in 1881 after “infinite trying to reconcile a scientific 
view of life with the emotional and spiritual” (Early Life, 192):
General Principles. Law has produced in man a child who cannot but 
constantly reproach its parent for doing much and yet not all, and 
constantly say to such parent that it would have been better never to have 
begun doing than to have overdone so indecisively; that is, than to have 
created so far beyond all apparent first intention (on the emotional side), 
without mending matters by a second intent and execution, to eliminate 
the evils of the blunder of overdoing. The emotions have no place in a 
world of defect, and it is a cruel injustice that they should have developed 
in it.
If Law itself had consciousness, how the aspect of its creatures 
would terrify it, fill it with remorse! (Early Life, 192)
This passage, written at the beginning of Hardy’s career as a tragic novelist, contains all 
of the philosophical underpinnings of The Dynasts: the conception of humanity as 
organism, the unconscious natural laws, the difficulties of emotionally sensitive creatures 
in an indifferent world, and the disconnection between human sympathy and human 
behavior. At the same time, the note contains the same emphasis on the role of sympathy. 
In another journal entry, written in 1890 (a year before the publication of Tess), Hardy 
sums up his ideas by observing that 
Altruism, or The Golden Rule, or whatever ‘Love your Neighbor as 
Yourself’ may be called, will ultimately be brought about I think by the 
14
pain we see in others reacting on ourselves, as if we and they were part of 
one body. Mankind, in fact, may be and possibly will be viewed as 
members of one corporeal frame (Early Life, 294).
These notes further reinforce the continuity of thought between the tragic novels 
and The Dynasts. They suggest that Hardy was developing the ideas expressed in The 
Dynasts for some time before he actually wrote his verse drama. They further suggest that 
the notion of the “full look at the Worst” of the “Apology” and “In Tenebris” is 
fundamentally similar to Hardy’s idea of the development of sympathy and the evolution 
of the Immanent Will. The evolving consciousness of the Immanent Will in The Dynasts 
and the process of “evolutionary meliorism” in the “Apology” are inextricably linked by 
their emphasis on the role of sympathy and reflection in the development of a more just 
society. This focus on the potential power of reflection on tragic events is central to any 
understanding of the optimistic Darwinian narratives that inform Hardy’s tragedy. 
With these things in mind, it is possible to return to The Dynasts and find passages 
which explicitly connect the ideas of evolutionary meliorism and its “full look at the 
Worst” with the evolving consciousness of the Immanent Will. In the Fore Scene, for 
example, the other spirits reproach the Chorus of the Pities for lamenting the plight of 
mankind. When the Shade of the Earth asks about suitable replacements for the leaders of 
the various nations, the Chorus replies:
We would establish those of kindlier build,
In fair Compassion skilled,
Men of deep art in life-development;
15
Watchers and warders of thy varied lands,
Men surfeited of laying heavy hands
Upon the innocent,
The mild, the fragile, the obscure content
Among the myriads of thy family.
Those, too, who love the true, the excellent,
And make their daily moves a melody (3).
In these lines, Hardy describes his model for the ideal human being: he or she must be 
compassionate, caring for his or her fellow humans as well as the Earth and its creatures, 
and must have a love for truth, justice, and art. The evolution of such a race of man is the 
primary goal of Hardy’s idea of evolutionary meliorism, and it is important to look at the 
way that the various spirits discuss the Chorus’ proposal. The Shade of the Earth, for 
example, assigns responsibility for such developments to humankind itself:
They may come, will they. I am not averse.
Yet know I am but the ineffectual Shade
Of her the Travailler, herself a thrall
To It; in all her labourings curbed and kinged (3).
The Spirit of the Years, however, expresses its doubts about the possibility of such 
developments:
Shall such be mooted now? Already change
Hath played strange pranks since first I brooded here.
But old Laws operate yet; and phase and phase
16
Of men’s dynastic and imperial moils
Shape on accustomed lines (3).
In both responses, the emphasis is on the role of humanity’s newly developed 
consciousness and their sense of semi-independent will. The development of individual 
consciousness is the foremost of the “strange pranks” played by change that the Spirit of 
the Years mentions. And the Shade of the Earth, operating as spokesperson for the Earth 
itself, claims that it would not oppose the development of such a race of men, a claim that 
implies that such a development could logically follow the evolutionary developments 
that have already occurred, if mankind wills it to be so.
The mechanism for such a change is mentioned explicitly by the Spirit of the 
Pities a few lines later and it is acknowledged by the Spirit Sinister in an aside. Asked 
why it wastes its compassion on humans, the Spirit of the Pities replies that “They 
[humans] are shapes that bleed, mere manikins or no,/ And each has parcel in the total 
Will” (4). The Spirit Sinister, in response, says, “Limbs of Itself:/Each one a jot of It[The 
Immanent Will] in quaint disguise? I’ll fear all men henceforward!” (4). The implicit 
suggestion is that human will, informed as it is by consciousness, can contribute to the 
development of the Pities’ ideal race of humans.
Despite the power that Hardy ascribes to human will as a result of that 
consciousness, he does not suggest that humankind is therefore free from from the 
influence of heredity or instinct. In the letter to Howard Wright mentioned above, he 
explains the implications of his ideas on the debate over free will:
This theory [of the Immanent Will], too, seems to me to settle the question
17
of Free-will v. Necessity. The will of man is, according to it, neither 
wholly free nor wholly unfree. When swayed by the Universal Will (which
he mostly must be as a subservient part of it) he is not individually free; 
but whenever it happens that all the rest of the Great Will is in equilibrium 
the minute portion called one person’s will is free, just as a performer’s 
fingers are free to go on playing the pianoforte of themselves when he 
talks or thinks of something else and the head does not rule them (Later 
Years, 124-5).
It is important that this assessment, too, be read in the light of Hardy’s idea of 
evolutionary meliorism and the development of society as an organism. While it may 
seem to ascribe to individuals very little control over their destiny, it is based on the 
recognition that humanity has already won a great coup by achieving consciousness and 
that it is within the realm of possibility that that revolution could spread to all of 
existence. In that sense, humanity has gained much, and it has the potential to employ 
what it already has in order to gain still more.
Hardy’s views on the potential of human will suggest a narrative that is 
fundamentally different from the pessimistic response to Darwin described by Robinson, 
Morton, and other proponents of the determinist narrative in Hardy’s work. In place of 
their understanding of Hardy, we are confronted with an idea of Hardy as a pragmatist, 
exploiting his understanding of humanity’s free will to serve a philosophical view bent on 
the improvement of the individual and of society as an interconnected whole. In the place 
of a desolate longing for God, we are presented with a cautious hope that the simple, 
18
“man-faced” idea of God could be replaced by a belief in the attainability of a 
fundamental unity of all creation through sympathy and compassion. What Hardy viewed 
as an outmoded understanding of religion was to be slowly replaced with the 
understanding of religion “in its modern sense entirely, as being expressive of nobler 
feelings towards humanity and emotional goodness and greatness” (Later Years, 121).
In exploring Hardy’s doctrine of evolutionary meliorism and the developing 
consciousness of the Immanent Will, it is certainly fair to say that Darwin’s theories 
played a central role in the development of those ideas. That is not to say that Hardy, as 
Robinson suggests, responded to Darwin with despair and gave up on the future of 
humanity. Instead, there is every suggestion that he embraced Darwin, using his work as 
a central source in the development of his doctrine of evolutionary meliorism.
In the “Apology,” Hardy spends a good deal of time talking about the role that 
religion and literature both have to play in the betterment of society:
In any event, poetry, pure literature in general, religion—I include 
religion, in its essential and undogmatic sense, because poetry and religion 
touch each other, or rather modulate into each other; are, indeed, often but 
different names for the same thing—these, I say, the visible signs of 
mental and emotional life, must like all other things keep moving, 
becoming; even though at present, when belief in witches of Endor is 
displacing the Darwinian theory and “the truth that shall make you free,” 
men’s mind’s appear, as above noted, to be moving backwards rather than 
on (561). 
19
Hardy’s remarks suggest every element of the doctrine of evolutionary meliorism: he 
asserts the power of “the visible signs of mental and emotional life” to change the nature 
of society for the better, he grounds that power in the continual evolution of mental and 
emotional capacities, and he makes that evolution contingent on the sober acceptance of 
certain rational observations, chief among them the ideas of Darwin. To be sure, Hardy 
makes it clear that progress is not the rule. In lamenting the “backwards” motion of men’s 
minds, Hardy emphasizes the fact that progress can be as easily undone by the influence 
of superstition and ignorance.
This shouldn’t come as a surprise to most readers of Hardy. As a young man, 
Hardy was “among the earliest acclaimers of The Origin of Species” (Early Life, 198), 
and he continued to follow Darwin’s work throughout his life. His personal writings 
make it clear that he was particularly attentive to Darwin's own ideas about the 
implications of evolution for theology. In one letter Hardy suggests that a Rev. Dr. A. B. 
Grosart, who had written asking how to “reconcile [Darwinian ideas] with the absolute 
goodness and non-limitation of God” could “be helped to a provisional view of the 
universe by the recently published life of Darwin” (Early Life, 269). Hardy even attended 
Darwin’s funeral at Westminster in 1883 (Early Life, 198).
Hardy’s extensive engagement with Darwin’s ideas suggests a feature of the 
doctrine of evolutionary meliorism that is often overlooked by critics: Hardy doesn’t use 
the term “evolutionary” to simply connote a gradual change. Rather, the term connotes 
the specific processes of evolutionary change posited by Darwin. Accepting this 
understanding of evolutionary meliorism and the Immanent Will means turning aside 
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from Robinson’s idea that Hardy did not respond to Darwin’s theory by “attempting any 
… schematized philosophy”(129), adopting instead the understanding that Hardy saw in 
Darwin the means for a systematic approach to the betterment of mankind.
Hardy’s idea of the evolution of society as an organism isn’t an entirely original 
one. Darwin treats the subject extensively in The Descent of Man. For Darwin, the 
starting point in the evolution of morality is the combination of a social instinct with a 
reasoning mind: 
Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the 
parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire 
a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become 
as well, or nearly as well, developed as in man (Descent 81).
This would occur, he explains, because social instincts “lead an animal to take pleasure in 
the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy for them, and to perform 
various services for them” (81). The next step in the process is particularly important:
As soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of 
all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the 
brain of each individual; and that feeling of dissatisfaction, or even misery, 
which invariably results, as we shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied 
instinct, would arise (Descent 81).
In this way,  Hardy’s idea that altruism would be brought about by “the pain we see in 
others reacting on ourselves” accords perfectly with Darwin’s understanding of the way 
that social instincts could develop into a moral sense. Darwin goes on to suggest that 
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“[t]he mere sight of suffering, independently of love, would suffice to call up in us vivid 
recollections and associations,” ultimately concluding that “‘to do unto others as ye 
would they should do unto you [...] is the foundation stone of morality” (Descent, 105). 
Furthermore, Darwin’s ideas provide a scientific justification for Hardy’s argument that a 
conscious Will was to be achieved through a “full look at the Worst,” a method that, 
according to Darwin’s theories, amounts to a voluntary engagement in the fundamental 
process of moral evolution.
Upon further examination of Darwin’s description of the process of moral 
evolution, the influence on Hardy becomes clearer. Writing about the tension between 
mankind’s base instincts and its newly developed moral sentiments, Darwin argues that 
any human, presented with the choice between acting on social instincts and acting on 
more selfish instincts  “will no doubt be apt to follow the stronger impulse” (94). In the 
early days of morality, he suggests, the stronger impulse would likely be the base instinct. 
Afterwards, when given time to ruminate on the judgment of society, the person in 
question will feel remorse, ultimately resolving “more or less firmly to act differently for 
the future; and this is conscience; for conscience looks backward, and serves as a guide 
for the future”(94). 
Darwin’s explanation of the tension between the base instincts and the more 
refined social instincts lines up with Hardy’s idea of the limited free will of mankind: 
while all humans are, as a result of their powers of reflection, free to feel remorse and to 
vow to take a different course of action in the future, they are still animals and therefore 
constrained by the powerful influence of older, more primal instincts. A blurring of the 
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lines between primal and social instincts further complicates the tension between the two 
forces. As Darwin explains, “although in civilized countries a good yet timid man may be 
far more useful to the community than the brave one, we cannot help instinctively 
honoring the latter above a coward, however benevolent” (Descent 98).
As civilization expands, Darwin explains, the progress of moral development is 
impeded yet again, this time by the clash of different cultures:
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought 
to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the 
same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once 
reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies 
extending to the men of all nations and races. If, indeed, such men are 
separated from him by great differences in appearance or habits, 
experience unfortunately shows how long it is before we look at them as 
our fellow-creatures (Descent 102).
These “artificial barriers” represent significant impediments to human progress, but, like 
the earlier impediments, they are not insurmountable. Looking to the future, Darwin 
charts the potential development of human morality:
as man gradually advanced in intellectual power, and was enabled to trace 
the more remote consequences of his actions; as he acquired sufficient 
knowledge to reject baneful customs and superstitions; as he regarded 
more and more not only the welfare, but the happiness of his fellow-men; 
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as from habit, following on beneficial experience, instruction, and 
example, his sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, 
extending to men of all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless 
members of society, and finally to the lower animals—so would the 
standard of his morality rise higher and higher (Descent 103-4).
The influence of this idea on Hardy is hard to overstate. Darwin describes a process that 
is fundamentally the same as Hardy’s process of evolutionary meliorism: the evolution of 
society as a whole through the act of reflection, resulting in the extension of sympathy to 
all creation. Darwin also expresses the hope, shared by Hardy, that this evolution could 
be the logical extension of developments that had occurred thus far. 
Hardy’s engagement with Darwin’s ideas about the evolution of morality have 
been treated only sparsely, most recently by Caroline Sumpter in her article “On 
Suffering and Sympathy: Jude the Obscure, Evolution, and Ethics.” Sumpter traces the 
connection between Hardy’s and Darwin’s ideas on the subject, ultimately observing that 
both Jude and Sue are “clearly among [Darwin’s] ‘few men’ (and women) whose 
sympathies already extend to both humans and animals,” Sumpter goes on to argue, 
however,  that “these highly sympathetic individuals are crushed by public opinion rather 
than able to reform it through ‘instruction and example,’” (672). Furthermore,  Sue and 
Jude’s inability to reform society is paired with a failure on the part of society, as “custom 
and public opinion fail to offer that ethically regulating role that Darwin optimistically 
granted them; the few sympathetic individuals are left to rely on their rudely acquired 
“social instincts” (679). Ultimately, Sumpter concludes that Hardy’s views on morality 
24
were more centered on the role of “biological determinism” and that he was “much less 
convinced than Darwin about the positive role of reason and habit in moral development” 
(672).4
This reasoning depends on two arguments. The first is that “hereditary factors, not 
training and habit, lead to Sue and Jude’s social restlessness and excess of 
sympathy”(678). Sumpter focuses especially on Jude’s sympathy for animals as a trait 
that he displays from his earliest days. It is worth noting, however, that the very first 
scene of the book depicts Jude's beloved teacher Richard Phillotson as he leaves for 
Christminster, instructing Jude to “Be a good boy … and be kind to animals and birds, 
and read all you can” (34). Given that Jude is defined throughout the novel by his strong 
sense of sympathy, for humans and animals alike, as well as his incessant pursuit of 
academics, it is hard to overstate the impact of Phillotson’s statement. This accords with 
Darwin’s description of the blurred line between nature and nurture: “ it is worthy of 
remark that a belief constantly inculcated during the early years of life, while the brain is 
impressible, appears to acquire almost the nature of an instinct; and the very essence of 
an instinct is that it is followed independently of reason” (Descent, 101). 
The tension between instinct, beliefs acquired at an early age, and reason helps to 
highlight another fundamental assumption in Sumpter’s argument. Sumpter suggests that 
the failure of Jude and Sue's contemporaries to sympathize with the unfortunate couple 
suggests that Hardy has eschewed the role of reason in the development of morality, an 
argument not borne out by the rest of Hardy's work. The depiction of the clash between 
Jude and Sue’s ideas and those of more conventional members of society fits in perfectly 
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with Darwin’s description of the barriers which must be overcome for morality to 
advance. 
In Descent, Darwin tackles the issue of why “savage” cultures have a lower 
morality than more developed ones:
The chief causes of the low morality of savages, as judged by our standard 
are, first, the confinement of sympathy to the same tribe. Secondly, powers 
of reasoning insufficient to recognize the bearing of many virtues, 
especially the self-regarding virtues, on the general welfare of the tribe. 
Savages, for instance, fail to trace the multiplied evils consequent on a 
want of temperance, chastity, etc. And thirdly, weak power of self-
command; for this power has not been strengthened through long-
continued, perhaps inherited, habit, instructions, and religions (99).
Furthermore, as Sumpter herself acknowledges, Darwin is explicit about the fact that the 
judgment of society “will not rarely err from ignorance and weak powers of reasoning,” 
giving rise to “the strangest customs and superstitions, in complete opposition to the true 
welfare and happiness of mankind” (Descent, 101). In other words, society’s failure to 
accommodate Jude and Sue’s unconventional relationship is a powerfully effective 
demonstration of the barriers to progress identified by Darwin. 
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the way Hardy crafts his narrative to work 
on the reader in service of that progress. More than any of Hardy’s other tragedies, the 
outcome of Jude constitutes the sort of  “full look at the Worst” called for in the 
“Apology.” And while the characters around Jude and Sue are unpersuaded by either 
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reason or sympathy for the ill-fated couple, the reader is. As Sumpter observes, “Hardy’s 
achievement may be to make us feel the loss of altruists in individual terms” (676). This 
sympathy for Jude and Sue is, according to Darwin, crucial to the advancement of 
morality. By encouraging the reader to reflect on Jude and Sue’s fate, Hardy encourages 
the Darwinian moment of reflection that pits superstition, habit, and selfish instinct 
against reason and sympathy. In this way, Hardy’s work reveals another fascinating debt 
to the ideas of Darwin.  
In Origin, Darwin begins his explanation of the mutability of species not with 
examples from the wild, but with examples of domesticated species. Tracing the 
development of certain domestic breeds, Darwin describes their adaptation “not indeed to 
the animal’s or plant’s own good, but to man’s use or fancy” (Origin, 34). Citing the 
example of certain breeders of pigeons in England and abroad, Darwin argues that “[t]he 
key is man’s power of accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man 
adds them up in certain directions useful to him. In this sense he may be said to make for 
himself useful breeds” (35).5
As Darwin explains, the effects of humankind's efforts on the evolution of various 
species have been visible for thousands of years, even if the scientific practice of plant 
and animal husbandry had been developed only recently. The change brought about by 
the development of scientific breeding, he writes, is the change away from purely natural 
selection:
For our purpose, a kind of Selection, which may be called Unconscious, 
and which results from every one trying to possess and breed  from the 
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best individual animals, is more important. Thus, a man who intends 
keeping pointers naturally tries to get as good dogs as he can, and 
afterwards breeds from his own best dogs, but he has no wish or 
expectation of permanently altering the breed. Nevertheless, I cannot 
doubt that this process, continued during centuries, would improve and 
modify any breed (Origin 38).
The difference between Conscious and Unconscious Selection in Darwin’s 
theories is crucial to an understanding of his influence on Hardy. It is the change to 
Conscious Selection that helps to free up the fingers of Hardy’s piano player, allowing 
humankind to take a hand in its own evolutionary development. This suggests a radical 
resolution to the conflict between fate and free will in Hardy’s tragedy. Darwin’s idea of 
Conscious Selection represents the ultimate act of human agency: the use of human 
ingenuity to fundamentally alter the effects of the Immanent Will. This opens up the 
possibility that Hardy could have found in Darwin cause for optimism. The opportunity 
to consciously steer the course of evolution transforms Hardy’s “full look at the Worst” 
from gloomy pessimism to the methodical examinations of a careful breeder of morality. 
Following this reading of Darwin’s influence on Hardy, the project of moral 
husbandry becomes the central purpose of Hardy’s tragic work. Hardy’s attempt to focus 
on the complexities of moral structures in nineteenth-century society represents an 
attempt at the conscious selection of moral values that is grounded specifically in 
Darwin’s explanation of the way that morality had developed and could continue to 
develop, overcoming the “artificial barriers” that prevented its progress. 
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This view of Hardy’s work allows for a new understanding of the narrative 
structures that he employed. Given Hardy’s emphasis on the role of “the pain we see in 
others reacting on ourselves,” his use of tragedy can be understood in an entirely new 
way.  Consider, for instance the way that he wrote about the genre: in an 1885 journal 
entry he argues that a tragedy “exhibits a state of things in the life of an individual which 
unavoidably causes some natural aim or desire of his to end in a catastrophe when carried 
out” (Early Life, 230). It is significant that in Hardy’s conception of tragedy, culpability is 
shifted from an individual with a tragic flaw to the “state of things in the life” of the 
individual. This leaves the protagonists room to be characters with whom readers could 
identify or sympathize. Tess Durbeyfield, for example, is explicitly described as “A Pure 
Woman,”  despite the approbation of her contemporaries.
Hardy manipulated this identification between reader and character very carefully. 
In an 1892 journal entry, he argues that “The best tragedies…are those of the WORTHY 
encompassed by the INEVITABLE. The tragedies of immoral and worthless people are 
not of the best” (Later Years, 19). In an earlier entry, he argues that 
[a] Plot, or Tragedy, should arise from the gradual closing in of a situation 
that comes of ordinary human passions, prejudices, and ambitions, by 
reason of the characters taking no trouble to ward off the disastrous events 
produced by the said passions, prejudices, and ambitions (Early Life, 157).
This note was written in 1878, the year that The Return of the Native was published, 
inaugurating Hardy’s career as tragedian. Like his description of the “best tragedies,” it 
focuses not on the culpability of the individual in bringing about the tragic end of a story, 
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but on the role of society as a whole. It is not the protagonist, but all of the characters 
who “tak[e] no trouble to ward off the disastrous events” of the plot. Hardy’s description 
of the source of those “disastrous events” is especially important. The “passions, 
prejudices, and ambitions” are clearly analogous to the forces at the heart of the 
Darwinian conflict over morality: instinct, sympathy, reason, and habit.
These subtle variations on the more traditional idea of tragedy are the practical 
results of Hardy’s understanding of Darwin. In the Darwinian narrative of the evolution 
of morality, moral decisions are depicted as the products of a struggle between instinct, 
sympathy, reason and habit, all of which vie for control of the individual. Conscience is 
the force that leads the individual to look back over his or her choices and decide whether 
those choices were morally correct. In Hardy’s tragedies, the reader is invited into 
carefully crafted moments of crisis, shown the outcome produced by the status quo, and 
invited to reflect on what might have been different. And while it is true that Hardy’s 
characters are fated to meet tragic ends, the author encourages his readers to think about 
the ways in which their own disasters and the disasters of others could be avoided if 
society as a whole took the trouble to approach each other with a more highly evolved 
sense of sympathy. 
Earlier critical work has, of course, focused on the incongruity between 
contemporary social conventions and Hardy’s treatment of his tragic characters and what 
its purpose could be. One work, in particular, Virginia R. Hyman’s Ethical Perspective in 
the Novels of Thomas Hardy deals extensively with the notion of the pain of the central 
characters and its effect on the ethical sensibilities of the reader. Hyman, however, views  
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Hardy’s writing in terms of his engagement with Comte, Stephen, Huxley and Mill, 
mentioning Darwin’s name only in passing and doing little to engage with his actual 
scientific ideas. As a result, she approaches the notion of a society that is evolving in the 
abstract sense but not in the concrete, Darwinian sense.6 Indeed, by overlooking Darwin’s 
description of the forces at play in the creation of conscience, Hyman minimizes the role 
of the reader’s reason in Hardy’s work, a role that is essential to Hardy’s project of 
evolutionary meliorism. Hyman argues that for Hardy “to make his readers aware that he 
was intentionally arousing their social sympathies would negate the emotional affect of 
the work itself” (25). Following a Darwinian reading, reader awareness is essential 
because it lies at the heart of the moment of reflection that produces a more evolved 
conscience. A sympathetic response opens the door to a conflict between the reader’s 
reason and his or her socialized habits and more base instincts. Hardy attempts to fix the 
outcome of this conflict by supplying the reader with a Darwinian genealogy of the 
biological and social forces undergirding the conflict of his fiction. 
This, then, is the essence of Hardy’s work in the genre of tragedy. Beginning 
especially with The Return of the Native and proceeding until the disastrous reception of 
Jude the Obscure and his decision to renounce fiction, Hardy embarked on a career of 
careful scientific examination and demonstration. Each novel represents a sort of 
dissection of the “organism” that is society, an attempt to show the reader the various 
biological and social forces at play within it. The action of each tragic novel hinges on a 
carefully crafted representation of the forces of instinct, emotion, habit and reason at the 
heart of major social issues of the time. 
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Perhaps more important, however, is the way that Hardy controls that 
representation, deliberately honing it to act on the sympathies and reason of the reader. 
This is especially clear in three of the major tragic novels, The Return of the Native, Tess 
of the d’Urbervilles, and Jude the Obscure. A Darwinian reading shows Hardy working 
throughout his career in tragedy to perfect a number of narrative structures that form the 
foundation of his attempt at educating and improving society. These commonalities 
include the conflict between a character who is presented as explicitly representative of 
humanity’s future and those who represent the status quo, the dissection of the 
evolutionary and social forces behind a major social convention, and a climax that is 
driven by the conflict between instincts, habit, reason, and superstition. Collectively, 
these narrative choices represent a conscious and methodical attempt by Hardy to 
deliberately sway the attitudes of the reader, to bend the unconscious Immanent Will 
toward consciousness by exploiting the Darwinian process as Hardy understood it.
Such a project was, to say the least, ambitious. Darwin observed, in his discussion 
of methodical breeding in The Origin of Species, that 
[n]ot one man in a thousand has accuracy of eye and judgment sufficient 
to become an eminent breeder. If gifted with these qualities, and he studies 
his subject for years, and devotes his lifetime to it with indomitable 
perseverance, he will succeed, and may make great improvements; if he 
wants any of these qualities he will assuredly fail (36).
In a sense, this highlights the ultimate optimism of Hardy’s project. As Darwin suggests, 
the work of husbandry demands a continuous, meticulous attention to detail and a 
32
perseverance that is rare indeed. Hardy’s writing, both personal and private, suggests a 
belief that not only could the same sort of work be done to improve society, but that a 
writer could, through well-crafted fiction, train their readers to do the work as well. 
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Chapter Two
The Future of Morality and the “Sense of Sex”
Let him in whose ears the low-voiced Best is killed by the clash of the First,
Who holds that if way to the Better there be, it exacts a full look at the Worst,
Who feels that delight is a delicate growth cramped by crookedness, custom, 
and fear,
Get him up and be gone as one shaped awry; he disturbs the order here.
“In Tenebris II”7
What I insist on is, that to explain such verses as this: “Whither is thy 
beloved gone, O thou fairest among women?” by the note: “The Church 
professeth her faith” is supremely ridiculous!”
-Sue Bridehead, Jude the Obscure8
One of the most striking elements of The Descent of Man is the way that Darwin 
expands the process of natural selection beyond the development of living things, 
bringing everything from language to fashion to morality under its umbrella. He is careful 
to ground these ideas in a conversation that had begun to take place among scholars in a 
variety of fields at the time. In the years since the publication of Origin, Darwin observes, 
philologists such as Max Müller had depicted the development of language as a struggle 
for life among various words and linguistic constructions. Darwin puts an explicit label 
on this struggle, arguing that “the survival or preservation of certain favored words in the 
struggle for language is Natural selection” (74). For Darwin, this observation opens a 
floodgate of ideas about the development of the customs and habits of a given culture:
According to a large and increasing school of philologists every language 
bears the marks of its slow and gradual evolution. So it is that the art of 
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writing, or letters are rudiments of pictorial representations. It is hardly 
possible to read Mr. [John] M’Lennan’s work and not admit that almost all 
civilized nations still retain traces of such rude habits as the forcible 
capture of wives. What ancient nation, as the same author asks, can be 
named that was originally monogamous? The primitive idea of justice, as 
shown by the law of battle and other customs of which vestiges still 
remain, was likewise most rude. Many existing superstitions are remnants 
of former false religious beliefs. The highest form of religion - the grand 
idea of God hating sin and loving righteousness - was unknown during 
primeval times (Descent, 122-3).
Darwin’s insight, then, is to expand upon the notions of his contemporaries about 
the evolutionary nature of the customs, habits, and social structures of a given culture, 
creating a framework for understanding cultures as organisms that have evolved 
according to the same process as individual species. At the heart of this evolution is the 
sort of internal struggle for survival that Darwin describes in his arguments about the 
evolution of morality, a struggle in which new ideas take the place of the biological 
mutations that drive the development of species. In this way, all new cultural products 
must survive three great struggles: the struggle for expression that is constantly taking 
place within the individual, the struggle for survival of the individual within the broader 
culture, and the struggle for the survival of that culture in the global population.
Darwin’s focus on the “traces of...rude habits” suggests that much of 
contemporary culture had evolved according to natural or unconscious selection and had 
yet to make the leap to the sort of methodical selection that eminent breeders had made in 
the development of various species of plants and livestock. Thus, while Victorian 
matrimony was no longer a matter of the “forcible capture” of wives, he suggests that 
contemporary society had yet to root out some lingering aspects of its original nature. 
Darwin also examines such practices as slavery and “primogeniture with entailed estates” 
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(115), noting that slavery “is a great crime; yet it was not so regarded until quite recently, 
even by the most civilized nations” (97), and that while primogeniture constitutes a 
“direct evil” for society, “it may formerly have been a great advantage by the creation of 
a dominant class, and any government is better than none” (115).
Darwin’s ultimate conclusion regarding this process is that the time of the eminent 
breeder of morals has arrived. Near the end of the passage on morality, he issues what is 
essentially a challenge, couched explicitly in the terminology of animal husbandry:
In the breeding of domestic animals, the elimination of those individuals, 
though few in number, which are in any marked manner inferior, is by no 
means an unimportant element toward success. This especially holds good 
with injurious characters which tend to reappear through reversion, such 
as blackness in sheep; and with mankind some of the worst 
dispositions,which occasionally without any assignable cause make their 
appearance in families, may perhaps be reversions to a savage state, from 
which we are not removed by very many generations. This view seems 
indeed recognized in the common expression that such men are the black 
sheep of the family (116-7).
He goes on to outline the stakes of such a challenge, arguing that “[i]f the various 
checks...do not prevent the reckless, the vicious,and otherwise inferior members of 
society from increasing at a quicker rate...the nation will retrograde” (119).
The checks that Darwin suggests can prevent this moral regression are precisely 
those traits that lead to the development of a more refined morality:
as man gradually advanced in intellectual power, and was enabled to trace 
the more remote consequences of his actions; as he regarded more and 
more not only the welfare, but the happiness of his fellow-men; as from 
habit, following on beneficial experience, instruction, and example, his 
sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, extending to men of 
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all races, to the imbecile, maimed, and other useless members of society, 
and finally to the lower animals (103-4)
This highly developed intellect and sense of sympathy work in concert, in Darwin’s view, 
to support the final trait that he suggests is crucial to the development of higher morality: 
self control. Discussing the “low morality of savages,” Darwin suggests that among 
primitive peoples, “this power has not been strengthened through long-continued, perhaps 
inherited, habit, instructions, and religion” (99). In this way, self-control can be seen as 
the process of higher moral impulses or instincts winning out in the struggle with more 
primal urges, as when the urge to procreate is made subservient to the more recently 
evolved notion of chastity.
Hardy's fiction can be seen simultaneously as a response to Darwin's challenge 
and an attempt to extend that challenge to a broader audience. The plots of Hardy’s 
tragedies essentially follow the same Darwinian arc: an individual who demonstrates the 
next stage in intellectual and emotional development required for the advancement of 
morality is introduced into an unsympathetic society. The conflict of the novels proceeds 
from the struggles, both within the individual and between the individual and the larger 
society, for the survival of those traits. The tragic outcomes of the novels are rooted in the 
fact that Hardy places those new traits in opposition to more primal instincts, particularly 
sexual desire, and the customs surrounding them, driving the new traits to extinction 
either through the death of the protagonist or through an atavistic return to more 
traditional values on the part of the protagonist. These tragic endings are meant to engage 
the sympathies of the reader while also appealing to their reason through the dissection of 
those internal and external forces that overcome the protagonists’ new views. In this way, 
Hardy applies the principles outlined in Descent toward the project of moral husbandry 
first suggested by Darwin.
In Hardy, as in Darwin, the advanced notions of the protagonists have their roots 
in the development of intellect, in particular the pursuit of unconventional studies or 
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interests. From the beginning, each of Hardy’s forward-thinking protagonists is intimately
associated with education and its effects. When Angel Clare, the defiant agnostic of Tess 
of the d’Urbervilles, first appears at a club-walking and dance at the beginning of the 
novel, Hardy's depiction of the young man suggests an appearance that defies traditional 
description, ultimately defining him by his broad intellectual interests:
there was an uncribbed, uncabined aspect in his eyes and attire, implying 
that he had hardly as yet found the entrance to his professional groove. 
That he was a desultory student of something and everything might only 
have been predicted of him (41).
The object of his attention at the dance, the young Tess Durbeyfield, is likewise described 
in terms of her intellectual advancement in relation to her impoverished rural background 
and the backwardness of her parents. In his first description of Tess, Hardy observes that 
“[t]he dialect was on her tongue to some extent, despite the village school,” (40), creating 
a sense of the tension between the culture of traditional rural England and the modern era. 
This conflict is clearest in the comparisons of Tess and her mother. Joan Durbeyfield 
speaks in dialect, but Tess, “who had passed the Sixth Standard in the National School 
under a London-trained mistress, spoke two languages; the dialect at home, more or less; 
ordinary English abroad and to persons of quality” (46). As a result of her education, Tess 
is portrayed as so far in advance of her mother that “there was a gap of two hundred years 
as ordinarily understood [between them]. When they were together the Jacobean and the 
Victorian ages were juxtaposed” (48).9
Likewise, both Jude and Sue, the protagonists of Jude the Obscure, are introduced 
as characters fixated on and defined by academic achievement from the outset. Like Tess 
and Angel, they come together at different stages in their development, with Sue playing 
the intellectual mentor to Jude in much the same way that Angel does to Tess. Jude's 
education begins with the lessons of his childhood hero, the schoolteacher Phillotson, and 
the aunt who serves as his guardian. Phillotson, as he leaves the village to pursue the life 
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of an academic, urges Jude to “read all [he] can” (34), while his aunt bemoans the fact 
that he didn’t join Phillotson in Christminster: “'Why didn’t ye get the schoolmaster to 
take ‘ee to Christminster wi’un, and make a scholar of ‘ee?'” (38). From that point on, 
much of young Jude’s character is defined by his voracious reading and desperate but 
clumsy attempts to ready himself for a career in academics.
His cousin Sue, likewise, is presented as an insatiable student. By Sue’s own 
reckoning, her life prior to her introduction in the novel has been “entirely shaped by 
what people call a peculiarity,” namely that she has “no fear of men, as such, nor of their 
books” (167). This has led her to close personal and intellectual relationships with a 
number of men, particularly a young undergraduate with whom she used to go on 
“walking tours, reading tours, and things of that sort” (168). Unlike Jude, whose 
obsession with Christminster is equally academic and spiritual, Sue is interested only in 
secular education. In recounting her experiences with the young undergraduate with 
whom she previously lived, she explains that she has “no respect for Christminster 
whatever, except, in a qualified degree, on its intellectual side” (170).
Perhaps the most striking example of the way that Hardy grounds his protagonists 
in their intellectual aspirations and achievements is Clym Yeobright, the eponymous hero 
of The Return of the Native. Like Angel, Clym has had the advantage of elevated social 
standing, wealth, and the educational access that comes with them. When Yeobright 
finally appears nearly a third of the way through the novel, Hardy’s description of him 
suggests a character so thoroughly defined by his intellectual pursuits that it has 
physically altered his appearance:
His countenance was overlaid with legible meanings. Without being 
thought-worn he yet had certain marks derived from a perception of his 
surroundings, such as are not unfrequently found on men at the end of four 
or five years of endeavour at which follow the close of placid pupilage. He 
already showed that thought is a disease of the flesh, and indirectly bore 
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evidence that ideal physical beauty is incompatible with emotional 
development and a full recognition of the coil of things. Mental 
luminousness must be fed with the oil of life, even though there is already 
a physical need for it; and the pitiful sight of two demands on one supply 
was just showing itself here” (156).
In this way, Clym has something in common with the scarlet-stained reddleman, 
Diggory Venn, who “had relinquished his proper station in life for lack of interest in it” 
(101), choosing instead to pursue a career that literally marks him as separate from 
society and staining his skin with a dye that reduces him to “a sublimation of all the 
horrid dreams which had afflicted the juvenile spirit since imagination began” (100). Like 
Clym, Diggory is physically defined by both his emotional and intellectual development: 
“after looking at him one would have hazarded the guess that good-nature, and an 
acuteness as extreme as it could be without verging on craft, formed the framework of his 
character” (101). At the same time, Diggory's traditional physical beauty is noticeably 
altered by his choice of career, just as Clym's appearance is altered by his habit of 
reflection. Thus, Hardy remarks, Venn's appearance “was an instance of the pleasing 
being wasted to form the groundwork of the singular” (101). The appearance of both men 
is a reminder to the reader that their ideas place them squarely at the crossroads between 
old and new systems of philosophy.10 
Hardy’s development of his intellectually advanced protagonists plays out in a 
way that reinforces Darwin’s argument that such advancement would allow a person to 
“trace the more remote consequences of his actions” and to “reject baneful customs and 
superstitions” (Descent, 103). In particular, Hardy's characters often struggle with their 
understandings of theology and its relationship to primitive superstitions. They are then 
left to wrestle with the moral implications of questioning or even abandoning that 
theology. As Hardy progressed in his career, this element of his work put him 
increasingly at odds with many of his contemporaries.
40
Although Clym Yeobright, one of Hardy's earliest tragic protagonists, is presented
as less aggressive in his exploration of theology, he is still actively focused on a 
campaign to root out superstition and ignorance in his neighbors. Yeobright returns to his 
home on Egdon Heath ready to “clean out the cobwebs” of ignorance that he sees as 
plaguing his fellow heath-dwellers through a project of “high-class teaching” (203). This 
project is a response to his experience in the world of the Parisian diamond trade and his 
rejection of material ambition. More than that, though, Hardy’s descriptions of Clym 
suggest something deeper behind the young man's attempts to overthrow old systems of 
superstition. The description of Clym’s physical beauty as “incompatible with ... a full 
recognition of the coil of things” is further developed in a later passage which suggests 
that Clym’s unique appearance is the result of his engagement with contemporary 
scientific developments, an engagement that will soon be so popular that it will bring 
about a shift in aesthetic ideals. “Should there be a classic period to art hereafter,” Hardy 
argues, “its Pheidias may produce such faces” (185). Hardy continues:
The truth seems to be that a long line of disillusive centuries has 
permanently displaced the Hellenic idea of life, or whatever it may be 
called. What the Greeks only suspected we know well; what their 
Aeschylus imagined our nursery children feel. That old-fashioned reveling 
in the general situation grows less and less possible as we uncover the 
defects of natural laws, and see the quandary that man is in by their 
operation. (185)
Of all Hardy’s tragic protagonists, Clym’s belief system is perhaps the most 
ambiguous. His ideas lack the full-throated denunciations of doctrine and dogma of 
Hardy’s later characters, focusing more on the petty superstitions of backwards Egdonites 
such as Christian Cantle and Susan Nunsuch. Still, the discussion of the “defects of 
natural laws” and “the quandary that man is in by their operation” suggests that the 
“typical countenance of the future” (185) that Clym’s face foreshadows will be sculpted 
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by a more profound change in our understanding of the world.11 Indeed, Clym’s failure to 
fully reach that understanding is central to the tragic outcome of the novel.
Another possible reason for Hardy’s comparatively timid approach to theology 
with Clym’s character is his decision to avoid placing Yeobright not at the forefront of 
social advancement, describing him instead as something of a “modern type” (185). 
Indeed, Yeobright’s notions are only advanced in comparison to those of the people 
whose company he has chosen to keep: “Mentally he was in a provincial future, that is, 
he was in many points abreast with the central town thinkers of his date” (190). 
According to Hardy's introduction, the action of the novel takes place “between 1840 and 
1850” (29), so it seems fair to argue that Hardy operated on the assumption that 
Yeobright’s ideas would be very familiar to the novel-reading public by the time of 
Return’s publication. 
Whatever the reasons for Hardy’s choices regarding Clym, by the writing of his 
later novels, he had clearly resolved to further pursue the Darwinian notion of intellect as 
enemy of superstition, deliberately courting controversy as he did so. Abandoning the 
vague allusions employed in his depiction of Yeobright, Hardy is much more explicit 
about the conclusions to which experience and education lead his later protagonists. Even 
before her fateful encounter with Alec d’Urberville, young Tess Durbeyfield shows no 
signs of the “old-fashioned reveling in the general situation” mentioned in Return. 
Applying a bit of her scientific education, Tess explains to her brother Abraham in an 
early scene that all of the stars are worlds, though some, like their own, are “blighted” 
(56). Asked what it would be like to be on one of the “splendid and sound” worlds, Tess 
explains that “father wouldn’t have coughed and creeped about as he does, and wouldn’t 
have got too tipsy to go this journey; and mother wouldn’t have been always washing, 
and never getting finished” (56). 
After her experiences with Alec, her resulting pregnancy, the social stigma that 
comes with it, and the eventual death of her child, Tess undergoes a sort of physical 
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transformation very much akin to that of Yeobright: 
Almost at a leap Tess thus changed from simple girl to complex woman. 
Symbols of reflectiveness passed into her face, and a note of tragedy at 
times into her voice (127).
The nature of her experiences is such that by the time Tess encounters Angel Clare, she is 
depicted as “expressing in her own native phrases - assisted a little by her Sixth Standard 
training - feelings which might almost have been called those of the age - the ache of 
modernism” (152). And it is through Angel and his ideas that Tess begins to develop a 
system of beliefs that follows the Darwinian narrative of advanced moral development.
Angel, like Clym, is described as having been universally recognized as a young 
man of promise: “as a lad people had said of him that he was one who might do anything 
if he tried” (142). Like Clym, his education and experience lead him to react against what 
he identifies as the pernicious influence of superstition on society. Unlike Clym, however, 
this brings him into direct conflict with Christianity and his upbringing as the child of a 
clergyman. Citing the church’s “untenable redemptive theolatry” (143), Clare refuses the 
opportunity of a university education and a life in the clergy, arguing that what the Church 
requires is a reasoned rejection of irrational and superstitious doctrine:
I cannot underwrite Article Four (leave alone the rest), taking it ‘in the 
literal and grammatical sense’ as required by the Declaration; and 
therefore I can’t be a parson in the present state of affairs...My whole 
instinct in matters of religion is towards reconstruction; to quote your 
favorite Epistle to the Hebrews, ‘the removing of those things that are 
shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which cannot be 
shaken may remain’ (144).
In laying out the philosophy of Angel Clare, Hardy was certainly taking a bold step 
beyond what he had dared with Clym in Return. With its discussion of “the defects of 
natural laws” and “a full recognition of the coil of things,” Return simply leaves the door 
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open to a scientific critique of dogmatic Christianity. In Tess, Hardy is much more explicit. 
In some ways, Angel’s (and later, Tess’s) ideal of religion without dogma or superstition is
a vastly more irreligious reading of Darwin’s ideas than Darwin himself was willing to 
publish in his lifetime.
The example of the central couple in Jude is even more striking. In Jude, Sue takes 
the place of Angel as master, while Jude takes Tess’s place as pupil. Trained by her 
experience with her undergraduate friend, whom she describes as “the most irreligious 
man I ever knew; and the most moral” (170), Sue is seen early on railing against the 
“medievalism” of Christminster, calling it “a place full of fetichists[sic] and ghost-seers” 
and insisting that “intellect in Christminster is pushing one way, and religion the  other; 
and so they stand stockstill, like two rams butting each other” (170). Like Angel, Sue is 
devoted to the attempt to shift the balance of that struggle in favor of intellect, taking the 
project so far that she literally re-creates her Bible: 
I altered my old [New Testament] by cutting up all the Epistles and 
Gospels into separate brochures, and re-arranging them in chronological 
order as written, beginning the book with Thessalonians, following on 
with the Epistles, and putting the Gospels much further on. Then I had the 
volume rebound. … I know that reading it afterwards made it twice as 
interesting as before, and twice as understandable (171).12
As with Angel and Tess, the influence of Sue’s ideas on Jude (helped more than a little by 
his romantic attachment to her) leads him through a dramatic series of philosophical 
changes. Having started his studies with dreams of reaching the highest clerical offices, 
Jude abandons those notions in his pursuit of Sue, choosing to “go on believing as 
before” but “to [profess] nothing and no longer [own] and [exhibit] engines of faith” 
(235). By the time of Sue’s return to Phillotson, he has largely foregone attending church 
services at all.
Although the degree to which the various protagonists’ education leads them to 
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such a direct engagement with or assault on dogma and doctrine varies, one thing is true 
of all five characters: they do not respond to the loss of old beliefs or superstitions with 
despair. Rather, they all share a sense of the crucial importance of the search for a moral 
system that is more altruistic and egalitarian. Central to this search is an emphasis on The 
Golden Rule, which Darwin himself referred to as “the foundation-stone of morality” 
(Descent, 111). Thus Clym Yeobright, shaken to his core by the tragic deaths of his 
mother and wife, finds himself clinging to the value that most informed his entire project 
of education, vowing to become “an itinerant preacher of the Eleventh Commandment” 
(393). Likewise, Tess’s explanation of the ideology that she has absorbed from Angel in 
her time with him is that she has religion without a belief in anything supernatural, 
focusing instead on “the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount” (344). Without dogma, she 
explains to the incredulous Alec d’Urberville, one can still have “the religion of loving-
kindess and purity at least” (353), a proposition that Hardy defends by noting a 
fundamental difference between “theology and morals, which in the primitive days of 
mankind had been quite distinct” (353). 
Of all Hardy’s protagonists, Jude Fawley is most well-suited to adopt this 
philosophy of an altruistic and rational religion without dogma. Jude, like Darwin’s 
hypothetical man of highest moral values, is animated by a sympathy so strong that it 
extends to all animals, perhaps stemming from Phillotson’s early admonition not only to 
read, but to “[b]e a good boy....and be kind to animals and birds” (34). Jude certainly does 
as Phillotson wishes, displaying the sort of sympathy to lower animals described by 
Darwin, which Hardy describes as “a magic thread of fellow-feeling” that binds his life to  
those of animals and even plants. Hardy sums up Jude’s pronounced sense of sympathy in 
an early passage:
He was a boy who could not himself bear to hurt anything. He had never 
brought home a nest of birds without lying awake in misery half the night 
after, and often reinstating them in their original place the next morning. 
45
He could scarcely bear to see trees cut down or lopped, form a fancy that it 
hurt them; and late pruning, when the sap was up, and the tree bled 
profusely, had been a positive grief to him in his infancy. (41)
This heightened sense of sympathy is a trait shared by all of Hardy's protagonists. 
Clym Yeobright, for example, arrives in Egdon as “a John the Baptist who took 
ennoblement rather than repentance for his text” (190). Yeobright has undertaken this 
project specifically as the result of his love for his fellow man:
Yeobright loved his kind. He had a conviction that the want of most men 
was knowledge of a sort which brings wisdom rather than affluence. He 
wished to raise the class at the expense of individuals rather than 
individuals at the expense of the class. What was more, he was ready at 
once to be the first unit sacrificed. (190)
This impulse toward self-sacrifice is confirmed when, after nearly blinding himself in the 
pursuit of his studies, Clym responds with “[a] quiet firmness, and even cheerfulness,” 
(260). As Hardy explains, “Yeobright was an absolute stoic in the face of mishaps which 
only affected his social standing, and...the humblest walk would satisfy him if it could be 
made to work in some form of his culture scheme” (260).
Angel Clare displays a similar disdain for class distinctions, one which proceeds 
from his irreligious views and his focus on the altruistic elements of Christianity. Thus, 
after discussing Clare’s issues with literal theology and his “instinct...towards 
reconstruction,” Hardy explains that
[t]he effects of this decisive debate were not long in showing themselves. 
He spent years and years in desultory studies, undertakings, and 
meditations; he began to evince considerable indifference to social forms 
and observances. The material distinctions of rank and wealth he 
increasingly despised. Even the ‘good old family’ … had no aroma for 
him unless there were good new resolutions in its representatives. (144)
46
Hardy portrays Angel as an academic who moves from theoretical egalitarianism to a 
practical experience that confirms his suspicions about existing class distinctions, if only 
after overcoming some initial awkwardness:
Much to his surprise he took, indeed, a real delight in their 
companionship. The conventional farm-folk of his imagination - 
personified in the newspaper-press by the pitiable dummy known as 
Hodge - were obliterated after a few days’ residence. … At first, it is true, 
when Clare’s intelligence was fresh from a contrasting society, these 
friends with whom he now hobnobbed seemed a little strange. Sitting 
down as a level member of the dairyman’s household seemed at the outset 
an undignified proceeding. The ideas, the modes, the surroundings, 
appeared retrogressive and unmeaning. But living on there, day after day, 
the acute sojourner became conscious of a new aspect in the spectacle. 
(145-6)
In Jude, Hardy presents Sue and Jude as being of two very different minds on this 
issue. For Jude, the revelation that Angel experiences at Dairyman Crick’s farm about the 
nature of class distinction and the value of physical work comes only fleetingly, always at 
odds with his idealized vision of the immeasurable worthiness of Christminster’s 
academic institutions. Whenever the notion occurs to Jude, however, Hardy leaves no 
doubt as to its truth. The first such revelation comes when Jude first sets foot in the 
stoneyards of Christminster:
For a moment there fell on Jude a true illumination; that here in the 
stoneyard was a centre of effort as worthy as that dignified by the name of 
scholarly study within the noblest of the colleges. But he lost it under 
stress of his old idea. (108)
The tension between Jude’s ideals and his experience is further heightened after he 
receives a brutally dismissive letter from a Christminster professor suggesting he would 
47
“have much better chance of success in life by remaining in [his] own sphere and sticking 
to [his] trade” (138). Reflecting on his experiences, Jude comes closer to abandoning his 
ideals, noting that
town life was a book of humanity infinitely more palpitating, varied, and 
compendious, than the gown life. These struggling men and women before 
him were the reality of Christminster, though they knew little of Christ or 
Minster. That was one of the humours of things. The floating population of 
students and teachers, who did know both in a way, were not Christminster 
in a local sense at all. (139)
Jude’s association with Sue and her much more radical ideology helps to cement 
this change of perspective. Sue’s notion of the injustice of class differences comes up 
most clearly in her discussion of the “medievalism” of Christminster, a city which she 
deplores as “an ignorant place, except as to the townspeople, artizans, drunkards and 
paupers” (170). In praising Jude, Sue goes on to express the same sense of injustice that 
continually intrudes upon Jude’s fantasies of Christminster academic life:
[The lower classes] see life as it is, of course; but few of the people in the 
colleges do. You prove it in your own person. You are one of the very men 
Christminster was intended for when the colleges were founded; a man 
with a passion for learning, but no money, or opportunities, or friends. But 
you were elbowed off the pavement by the millionaire’s sons. (170)
At this stage in the evolution of his thinking, the message is still somewhat lost on 
Jude, but as he moves closer and closer to Sue’s positions on matters of religion and 
metaphysics, he finds himself abandoning his idealistic view of Christminster elitism in 
favor of a more egalitarian view. Thus, by the time of little Father Time's arrival, Jude 
finds himself arguing that “excessive regard of parents for their own children, and their 
dislike of other people’s is, like class-feeling, patriotism, save-your-own-soul-ism and 
other virtues, a mean exclusiveness at bottom” (288). When Jude and Sue arrive in 
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Christminster for the last time near the end of the novel, he has come even farther in the 
direction of Sue’s thinking (and, by extension, in the direction of Darwin’s moral ideal) 
declaring himself to be
in a chaos of principles - groping in the dark - acting by instinct and not 
after example. Eight or nine years ago when I came here first, I had a neat 
stock of fixed opinions, but they dropped away one by one; and the further 
I get the less sure I am. I doubt if I have anything more for my present rule 
of life than following inclinations which do me and nobody else any harm, 
and actually give pleasure to those I love best. (336-7)
In this way, the evolution of Jude’s ideas and morality most closely parallels the 
Darwinian narrative of the evolution of higher morality, beginning at its roots in 
instinctive urges guided by superstition and the judgment of society and ultimately 
arriving at a morality grounded in altruism, guided by reason and experience.
An examination of Return, Tess, and Jude reveals the way that Hardy, building on 
the ideas that had captivated him since “Hap,” carefully honed his representation of the 
development and struggle for survival of that moral sense within the individual and the 
broader society. As Hardy himself suggests in the three novels, many of the specific ideas 
that inform this moral sense were hardly new, from the focus on altruism to the 
importance of reason to the subversion of existing religious beliefs and class structures. 
Yet the moral systems promoted by Hardy’s protagonists were far from dominant in 
contemporary culture, for reasons that Darwin himself explored in his work. This 
underscores the particular value of applying Darwin’s ideas to an attempt at moral 
improvement through fiction, particularly through tragedy: if, as Darwin argues, low or 
faulty moral systems were to be improved by the application of sympathy and reason, 
then the pathos of his characters’ tragic ends, combined with an intellectual examination 
of the forces that bring those ends, would serve as an effective method of bringing about 
change. In this way, Hardy's tragic protagonists serve as martyrs for the cause of moral 
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improvement.
For both Hardy and Darwin, one of the most important factors in that 
improvement was religion. In Descent, Darwin provides a concise narrative of his ideas 
about the likely evolutionary history of spirituality and organized religion, drawing on the 
work of then-contemporary anthropologists. He argues that while “the ennobling belief in 
the existence of an Omnipotent God” is not an innate human trait, studies of various 
civilizations around the world suggest that there is a universal tendency to invent spiritual 
or supernatural forces as a way of understanding the world:
If, however, we include under the term ‘religion’ the belief in unseen or 
spiritual agencies, the case is wholly different: for this seems to be 
universal with the less civilized races. Nor is it difficult to comprehend 
how it arose. As soon as the important faculties of the imagination, 
wonder, and curiosity, together with some power of reasoning, had 
become partially developed, man would naturally crave to understand 
what was passing around him, and would have vaguely speculated on his 
own existence. As Mr. M’Lennan[sic] has remarked, ‘Some explanation of 
the phenomena of life, a man must feign for himself; and to judge from the 
universality of it, the simplest hypothesis, and the first to occur to men, 
seems to have been that natural phenomena are ascribable to the presence 
in animals, plants, and things, and in the forces of nature, of such spirits 
prompting to action as men are conscious they themselves possess,”(77-8)
Darwin goes on to observe that this tendency to assign “animating spirits” to plants, 
animals, and even natural forces, “would easily pass into the belief in the existence of one 
or more gods. For savages would naturally attribute to spirits the same passions, the same 
love of vengeance or simplest form of justice, and the same affections which they 
themselves feel” (78). From there, he lays out a narrative of the rise of modern religion:
The same high mental faculties which first led man to believe in unseen 
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spiritual agencies, then in fetichism [sic], polytheism, and ultimately in 
monotheism, would infallibly lead him, as long as his reasoning powers 
remain poorly developed, to various strange superstitions and customs. 
Many of these are terrible to think of - such as the sacrifice of human 
beings to a blood-loving god; the trial of innocent persons by the ordeal of 
poison or fire; witchcraft, etc. Yet it is well occasionally to reflect on these 
superstitions, for they show us what an infinite debt of gratitude we owe to 
the improvement of our reason, to science, and to our accumulated 
knowledge. (79)
It is hard to overstate the importance of this narrative in terms of its influence on Hardy’s 
fiction. The legacy of man's initial attempts to understand the natural world and his own 
mind loom large throughout the tragic novels, casting a shadow down through the ages to 
darken the lives of all of Hardy's protagonists. 
It is not surprising that Hardy settled on exploring the issue so carefully, given the 
role that Darwin gives it in the internal moral struggle. At one point in Descent, Darwin 
once again refers to the importance of sympathy and reason in determining an 
individual’s actions, adding this qualifying statement: “Another element is most 
important, although not necessary - the reverence or fear of Gods or Spirits believed in by 
each man; and this applies especially in cases of remorse”(94). The influence of religion 
on morals, which Darwin suggested could simultaneously have positive effects while 
“infallibly” leading to such abominations as the torture and murder of innocents, became 
a fixation of Hardy’s. In his project of moral husbandry, the use of reason to root out 
superstition and its opposition to a higher moral order is a central goal, one which 
depends on carefully constructed representations of Darwin’s narrative of the origins of 
those superstitions and their role in contemporary theology.
Hardy’s Wessex is depicted as a place where this lineage surrounds the characters, 
sometimes quite dramatically.13  Thus the reader’s first view of Egdon Heath in Return 
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comes on Bonfire Night, when the figure of Eustacia Vye atop Rainbarrow could be 
mistaken for “the person of one of the Celts who built the barrow, so far had all of 
modern date withdrawn from the scene” (41).14 Eustacia, like the Celts before her, is 
succeeded by a more modern group, the motley crew of Egdonites who have come to 
celebrate Bonfire Night. But Hardy is careful to highlight the connection between modern 
and ancient practices, tracing both to something even more elemental and noting that 
[t]he ashes of the original British pyre which blazed from that summit lay 
fresh and undisturbed in the barrow beneath their tread. The flames from 
funeral piles long ago kindled there had gone down upon the lowlands as 
these were shining now. Festival fires to Thor and Woden had followed on 
the same ground and duly had their day. Indeed, it is pretty well known 
that such blazes as the heathmen were now enjoying are rather the lineal 
descendants from jumbled Druidical rites and Saxon ceremony than the 
invention of popular feeling about the Gunpowder Plot.
Moreover, to light a fire is the instinctive and resistant act of man 
when, at the winter ingress, the curfew is sounded throughout Nature. (44-
5)
Similarly, Hardy traces the history of May-Day reveling, suggesting at the end of the 
novel that “the impulses of all such outlandish hamlets are pagan still” and concluding 
that “in these spots homage to nature, self-adoration, frantic gaities, fragments of 
Teutonic rites to divinities whose names are forgotten, seem in some way or other to have 
survived mediaeval doctrine” (385). Likewise at the beginning of Tess he observes that 
while the primeval forests of Blackmore Vale were no longer visible, “some old customs 
of their shades remain...only in a metamorphosed or disguised form,” such as the 
transformation of the Pagan May-Day revel into the modern club-walking (38). The 
young Jude Fawley, like all the residents of Marygreen, draws his water from a well 
which has been in use throughout the long history of the village, which Hardy traces to its
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location alongside an ancient Roman road.
In this way, Hardy’s settings provide an excellent backdrop for his examination of 
the origins and implications of modern religious beliefs. The notion, continually 
expressed in Hardy’s Wessex novels, that the primitive origins of modern culture are on 
display at all times in rural England prepares the reader for a more focused examination 
of the evolutionary origins of the elements of that culture which Hardy critiques, 
particularly religion. 
The origins of the earliest phase of belief described by Darwin, that phase in 
which “savages imagine that natural objects and agencies are animated by spiritual or 
living essences” (Descent, 78) survives in the myriad superstitions of Hardy’s 
protagonists and the company they keep. Perhaps the best example is Christian Cantle of 
Return, who spends much of the novel scared of spirits and devils that he believes 
populate Egdon Heath. Cantle, portrayed as comically credulous and dim, serves as a 
convenient stand-in for a member of Darwin’s “less civilized races,” arriving at “strange 
superstitions and customs” precisely because of his poor reasoning skills. After a chance 
victory in a dice game, Christian gains his first moment of true confidence, but only 
through his belief that the dice used in the game are possessed of an animating spirit that 
can change his destiny: “What curious creatures these dice be - powerful rulers of us all, 
and yet at my command! I am sure I never need be afeard of anything after this” (235-6). 
Given the way that his name serves to attach his superstition to the broader 
Christian community, it is unsurprising that Cantle's bizarre notions are hardly out of the 
ordinary on Egdon Heath. The Egdonites on Bonfire Night are seen discussing the 
correspondence between the fullness of the moon at a boys’ birth and his manliness as an 
adult (53) and having a matter-of-fact discussion of the peculiar appearance of a ghost 
that has been seen wandering the Heath of late (later revealed to be the reddleman 
Diggory Venn). The Egdonites remark that the spirit looks “as if it had been dipped in 
blood,” even though it is common knowledge that “most ghosts be white” (53). Likewise, 
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Tess’s companions at Talbothays engage in a lengthy discussion of how a woman in love 
can prevent a batch of butter from hardening and how the only solution is to hire the 
services of a “conjuror” (160). In the same way that the Bonfire Night celebrations reflect 
a survival of an older worldview, these superstitions maintain their hold in Hardy’s 
Wessex, as yet untouched by a rational view that would render them ridiculous.
Early in Return, Hardy offers a glimpse of how ancient man might have 
progressed beyond simple, fetishistic views of the universe in his description of the 
“untameable, Ishmaelitish” (35) Egdon Heath. On Bonfire Night, after the revelers have 
gone and Eustacia has returned to the peak of Rainbarrow, Hardy describes the sound of 
the wind traveling through the plants of the heath and the impression that it leaves upon 
the listener:
'The spirit moved them.' A meaning of the phrase forced itself upon the 
attention; and an emotional listener’s fetichistic mood might have ended in 
one of more advanced quality. It was not, after all, that the left-hand 
expanse of the old blooms spoke, or the right-hand, or those of the slope in 
front; but it was the single person of something else speaking through each 
at once. (78)
This notion of identifying a single animating spirit that controls the entire Heath suggests 
the transition to a more modern monotheistic religion, or at least a system in which 
spiritual forces are united in a more orderly fashion toward a given purpose. 
Hardy grounds the theology of many of his characters in a logical process very 
much the same as that which causes Christian Cantle to view his dice and the random 
results they produce as products of a powerful spiritual agency. Young Jude’s notion of 
Christianity and the power of prayer, for instance, is not unlike Cantle’s view that he can 
use his dice to bring about any good fortune he desires:
People said that if you prayed things sometimes came to you, even though 
they sometimes did not. He had read in a tract that a man who had begun 
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to build a church, and had no money to finish it, knelt down and prayed, 
and the money came in by the next post. Another man tried the same 
experiment, and the money did not come; but he found afterwards that the 
breeches he knelt in were made by a wicked Jew. (45)
Jude’s story of the “wicked Jew” suggests another way that early polytheistic or 
fetishistic beliefs are adapted in contemporary religions: a whole pantheon of evil and 
vindictive spirits are simply lumped together into the form of the Devil and his minions. 
Thus moments of good fortune are ascribed to the action of heavenly powers, while tragic 
circumstances are blamed on the influence of diabolical agents. 
Hardy’s depiction of his characters' religious beliefs is couched in terms that are 
meant to leave no doubt as to how they should actually be viewed. Consider Clym’s 
reaction to his own guilt at not initiating a reconciliation with his mother before she died:
He continually bewailed his tardy journey to his mother’s house, because 
it was an error which could never be rectified, and insisted that he must 
have been horribly perverted by some fiend not to have thought before that 
it was his duty to go see her, since she did not come to him. (314)
In his insistence on the influence of “some fiend,” Yeobright avoids a confrontation of the 
harsh reality that both he and his mother were to blame for their split, just as they both 
had the opportunity to resolve it but failed to do so. Likewise, when Jude arrives at the 
Cathedral of Cardinal College, riddled with guilt over a recent bout of drinking and his 
conflicted feelings about a budding interest in Sue, he sees a special significance in the 
day’s reading from the 119th Psalm: 
It was the very question that was engaging Jude’s attention at this moment. 
What a wicked worthless fellow he had been to give vent as he had done 
to an animal passion for a woman and allow it to lead to such disastrous 
consequences; then to think of putting an end to himself; then to go 
recklessly and get drunk. The great waves of pedal music tumbled round 
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the choir, and nursed on the super-natural as he had been, it is not 
wonderful that he could hardly believe that the psalm was not specially set 
by some regardful Providence for this moment of his first entry into the 
solemn building. And yet it was the ordinary psalm for the twenty-fourth 
evening of the month. (114-5)
Both young men are caught in the grip of a powerful natural force and they ascribe it to 
the influence of the supernatural. In both Clym and Jude’s cases, however, that force is 
the power of their own conscience and the overwhelming feelings of remorse they 
experience as a result of their decisions. 
This is another point at which Hardy engages with the then-contemporary 
discussion about the origins of religion. Darwin asserts that early man “would naturally 
attribute to spirits the same passions, the same love of vengeance or simplest form of 
justice, and the same affections which they themselves feel”(Descent, 78). Hardy takes 
this a step further, suggesting that it is mankind’s tendency to attribute those values to 
deities because the deities spring out of humanity’s attempt to explain the powerful 
urgings of their own conscience, just as early man might create spirits out of natural 
forces such as fire, wind, or rain.15
This idea is most clearly expressed in a passage in Tess, shortly after the heroine's 
return from The Chase, as she wrestles with the response of her fellow villagers to her 
pregnancy:
At times her whimsical fancy would intensify natural processes around her 
till they seemed a part of her own story. Rather they became a part of it; 
for the world is only a psychological phenomenon, and what they seemed 
they were. The midnight airs and gusts, moaning amongst the tightly 
wrapped buds and bark of the winter twigs, were formulæ of bitter 
reproach. A wet day was the expression of irremediable grief at her 
weakness in the mind of some vague ethical being whom she could not 
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class definitely as the God of her childhood, and could not comprehend as 
any other.
But this encompassment of her own characterization, based on 
shreds of convention, people by phantoms and voices antipathetic to her, 
was a sorry and mistaken creation of Tess’s fancy - a cloud of moral 
hobgoblins by which she was terrified without reason. It was they who 
were out of harmony with the natural world, not she. … she looked upon 
herself as a figure of Guilt intruding into the haunts of Innocence. But all 
the while she was making a distinction where there was no difference. 
Feeling herself in antagonism she was quite in accord. She had been made 
to break an accepted social law, but no law known to the environment in 
which she fancied herself such an anomaly (114).
Tess’s confusion and sense of being judged sum up one of the primary issues that Hardy 
tackles throughout his tragedies: the problems created by theological systems whose 
moral prescriptions are invented in response to the misinterpretation of natural urges.  
As Darwin suggests, “[e]ven when an action is opposed to no special instinct, 
merely to know that our friends and equals despise us for it is enough to cause great 
misery. … The breach of a rule held sacred by the tribe will thus, as it seems, give rise to 
the deepest feelings”(Descent, 95).  Tess anthropomorphizes this misery, transforming 
everything around her into the tools of a judgmental deity, when both the deity and his 
agents are merely the products of her attempt to understand the natural world and the 
overwhelming power of a social instinct which causes her to shrink from the judgment of 
her peers. In Hardy’s tragic novels, contemporary moral systems serve as the chief 
obstacles to the propagation of his protagonists’ new ideas. Hardy's project of moral 
husbandry centers on a careful, reasoned examination of these moral systems and their 
origins, with a mind toward their modification or elimination. Perhaps because it is 
rooted in a biological urge that is so fundamental to our nature and so heavily regulated 
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by religion and culture, Hardy’s work is particularly concerned with the role of sexuality 
in these moral and religious systems.
In Hardy’s novels, sexuality is treated as a powerful force of nature, open to the 
same spiritual interpretation that renders lightning into malevolent spirits and the pangs 
of conscience into the judgment of an omniscient deity. This power is grounded in the 
Darwinian notion that basic instincts, like the urge toward procreation, can easily 
overcome more highly evolved moral sentiments or reason. The tragic outcome of Return 
of the Native, for instance, has its origins in the struggle between Clym’s high moral 
pursuits, his filial instincts, and his desire for Eustacia, which threatens to overcome both:
Thus as his sight grew accustomed to the first blinding halo kindled about 
him by love and beauty, Yeobright began to perceive what a strait he was 
in. Sometimes he wished that he had never known Eustacia, immediately 
to retract the wish as brutal. Three antagonistic growths had to be kept 
alive: his mother’s trust in him, his plan for becoming a teacher, and 
Eustacia’s happiness. His fervid nature could not afford to relinquish one 
of these, though two of the tree were as many as he could hope to 
preserve. (216)
In his descriptions of Eustacia Vye and her interaction with the various men and 
boys of Egdon Heath, Hardy outlines the process by which the imagination transforms 
sexual urges into a sort of malevolent force. In one of the earliest scenes of the novel, 
Eustacia is depicted as a mesmerizing presence, drawing men and boys alike to her 
bonfire. Indeed, the bonfire itself is the product of her overpowering influence, stoked by 
Johnny Nunsuch, a neighboring boy who is transformed into “a mere automaton, 
galvanized into moving and speaking by the wayward Eustacia’s will” (83). Eustacia’s 
influence on Nunsuch is so profound that Hardy likens him to “the brass statue which 
Albertus Magnus is said to have animated just so far as to make it chatter, and move, and 
be his servant” (83).
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Moments later Damon Wildeve appears, fresh from a meeting with his jilted 
fiancee and her guardian, an encounter in which he has asserted that the marriage must 
happen in order to maintain his own respectability. As such, it is a testament to Eustacia’s 
power that he arrives so promptly, bending to her will just as she predicted he would:
I merely lit the fire because I was dull, and thought I would get a little 
excitement by calling you up and triumphing over you as the Witch of 
Endor called up Samuel. I determined you should come; and you have 
come! I have shown my power. A mile and a half hither, and a mile and a 
half back to your home - three miles in the dark for me. Have I not shown 
my power? (87)
Eustacia’s comparison of herself to the Witch of Endor underscores Hardy’s argument 
about the nature of sexuality and its influence.16 Wildeve has every rational reason to 
avoid Eustacia, and yet he is drawn to her, precisely because she knowingly wields her 
sexuality so effectively.17 
Eustacia is not the only person to suggest that her power over men is a kind of 
witchcraft. Susan Nunsuch, Johnny’s mother, is certain that Eustacia is a witch who has 
her son under an evil spell. As such, despite her Christian beliefs, she is willing to stab 
Eustacia with a hatpin in church, drawing blood in an attempt to counteract the malign 
“spell” Eustacia has placed on Johnny. Near the end of the novel Susan Nunsuch is seen 
crafting a sort of voodoo doll using Eustacia's hair, a “ghastly invention of superstition, 
calculated to bring powerlessness, atrophy, and annihilation on any human being against 
whom it was directed,” (358). As she attacks the doll, the mother recites the Lord’s Prayer 
backwards in an attempt to defend her son by obtaining “unhallowed assistance against 
an enemy” (359). 
In the conflict between Eustacia’s unfettered sexuality and Susan Nunsuch’s 
bizarre act of superstition, Hardy suggests something about the  roots of contemporary 
Christian morality. Nunsuch’s attempt to enlist the help of powerful spirits to ward off 
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Eustacia’s bewitchment represents a primitive version of the attempt to control the 
irrational urges of sexuality with religion. This is a theme that runs throughout Hardy’s 
novels, although Return is perhaps most explicit in its discussion of the origins of the 
conflict and its modern legacy.
Hardy extends this idea of sexuality as a supernatural force beyond the confines 
of Egdon Heath in a long description of Eustacia immediately after her Bonfire Night 
meeting with Wildeve. He casts her as “the raw material of a divinity” and suggests that 
if she were transported to Mt. Olympus, “she would have done well with a little 
preparation” because she “had the passions and instincts which make a model goddess, 
that is, those which make not quite a model woman” (89). Chief among those passions is 
“her great desire,” simply put, “[t]o be loved to madness,” adding that “she seemed to 
long for the abstraction called passionate love more than for any particular lover” (92). 
Hardy’s invocation of the Olympians places the attempt to understand and control 
sexuality at the foundations of human civilization. Furthermore, he goes on to suggest 
that while humanity has moved on from worshipping the members of the Greek 
Pantheon, the godlike power that Eustacia yields is still very much a force in the world:
Had it been possible for the earth and mankind to be entirely in 
[Eustacia’s] grasp for a while, had she handled the distaff, the spindle, and 
the shears at her own free will, few in the world would have noticed the 
change of government. There would have been the same inequality of lot, 
the same heaping up of favors here, of contumely there, the same 
generosity before justice, the same perpetual dilemmas, the same captious 
alteration of caresses and blows that we endure now. (89)
This is a crucial notion in Return. Hardy suggests that Eustacia’s motivations, her 
vanity, her worldly ambition and desperation for the the cultured promenades of Paris (or 
even their dim shadow, the seaside resort of Budmouth), and her willingness to exploit 
sexuality in pursuit of those goals, though they appear to stick out in the context of Egdon
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Heath, are actually typical of the motivations and conflicts that undergird modern society. 
In this way, Hardy gives the struggle to understand, control, or exploit sexuality a central 
role in the development of morality.
The unjust results of this struggle between female sexuality and the attempt to 
control it are most on display in the story of Clym’s cousin, Thomasin, and her erstwhile 
suitor Damon Wildeve. Wildeve’s professional history sets him up as a sort of foil to 
Clym, who was a great success in the diamond trade. In contrast, Wildeve’s attempt at 
being an engineer is memorialized only in a plaque on the door of his inn:
Upon the door was a neglected brass plate, bearing the unexpected 
inscription, “Mr Wildeve, Engineer” - useless yet cherished relic from the 
time when he had been started in that profession in an office at Budmouth 
by those who had hoped much from him, and had been disappointed. (67)
Still, despite his failures in the professional world, Wildeve lives a fairly comfortable and 
respectable life on Egdon, although Hardy makes it clear that much of Wildeve’s material 
comfort is owing entirely to the work of those who came before him, particularly in the 
first description of the inn’s location, “Wildeve’s Patch”:
a plot of land redeemed from the heath, and after long and laborious years 
brought into cultivation. The man who had discovered that it could be 
tilled died of the labour: the man who succeeded him in possession ruined 
himself in fertilizing it. Wildeve came like Amerigo Vespucci, and 
received the honours due to those who had gone before. (62)
Wildeve serves as a foil to Clym in his social interactions and successes as well as 
in his commercial efforts. His movements are described as “the pantomimic expression of 
a lady-killing career” (68), and he is ultimately summed up as “one in whom no man 
would have seen anything to admire, and in whom no woman would have seen anything 
to dislike” (68). In other words, Wildeve is a man who can exert the same sort of sexual 
influence on women that Eustacia can on men. Unlike Eustacia, however, all the shame 
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and ignominy that results from his behavior attaches to Thomasin rather than to Wildeve 
himself. Thus, after it appears that she has been jilted on her wedding day, it is Thomasin 
that suffers most from her neighbors' opinions.  
When Thomasin’s aunt suggests that such experiences should be openly discussed 
by others, in order to “thoroughly fill the air with the past misfortune, so that other girls 
may take warning and keep clear of it,” (132), she seems to neatly sum up the Darwinian 
process by which basic instincts are regulated by the affects of social approbation. 
Crucial to Hardy’s effort, though, is the way that this underscores the injustice of that 
process when it is unguided by reason. Thomasin’s response alludes to this injustice:
“I am a warning to others, just as thieves and drunkards and gamblers 
are,” she said in a low voice. “What a class I belong to! Do I really belong 
to them? ‘Tis absurd! Yet why, aunt, does everybody keep on making me 
think that I do, by the way they behave towards me? Why don’t people 
judge me by my acts? Now, look at me as I kneel here, picking up these 
apples - do I look like a lost woman? … I wish all good women were as 
good as I!” she added vehemently. (132)
The imagery of the apples, combined with Thomasin’s assault on the notion of what 
makes a “fallen woman” serves to return attention to the primal conflict exemplified by 
the struggle between Susan Nunsuch and Eustacia Vye and the legacy of that conflict in 
contemporary Christianity. The simple Nunsuch, confronted by the apparently 
overwhelming power of Eustacia’s sexual appeal, can only conclude that there must be 
some magical force that requires an equally powerful magical force to counteract it. This 
primal failure of reason, Hardy suggests, has grown into a religious understanding  of 
marriage as an institution designed to keep that “power” of women in check, at the behest 
of a judgmental God. Thomasin's sin, like Eustacia's is a perceived refusal to curb that 
power according to the dictates of convention. This accords with Darwin’s idea that the 
development of religion “would infallibly lead...to various strange superstitions and 
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customs” (Descent, 79) and reinforces the notion of Hardy’s work as an attempt to root 
out such superstitions and customs through the use of the suffering of his protagonists.
Hardy further develops this idea of the evolutionary legacy of early religion in 
Tess, a novel which hinges on the issue that dogs Thomasin in the first half of Return: the 
notion of purity and acceptable expressions of female sexuality. But unlike Thomasin, 
whose primary difficulty is the loss of respectability, the question of whether Tess is, as 
Hardy asserts in the subtitle, “A Pure Woman,” will eventually decide her ability to find 
work, food, and shelter for herself, as well as for her family. By raising the stakes, Hardy 
makes more deliberate use of the process Darwin suggested was central to the evolution 
of morality, pairing his appeals to reason with a more concerted appeal to the sympathies 
of the reader. 
The centerpiece of Hardy’s argument in Tess is the disparity between what is 
preached and what is actually practiced by society at large. At the heart of this disparity is 
a fact that Hardy acknowledges much more explicitly in Tess than in Return: the fact that 
sexual impulses are a biological fact of life for both men and women. This is especially 
clear in the way Hardy describes the infatuation of Tess’s fellow milkmaids at Talbothays 
Farm with Angel Clare. In one scene, Hardy depicts Tess’s three friends at a window in 
their nightgowns, surreptitiously watching Angel as he works and gossiping about their 
love for him. One milkmaid, Retty Priddle, announces that she observed another, Izz 
Huett, kissing the shadow of Angel’s mouth on the wall while he wasn’t looking. They all 
admit that they are equally in love with him, beginning with Marian, who asserts that she 
“would just marry ‘n to-morrow!” to which one woman responds that she would do so, 
“and more,” drawing an agreement from the third (166).
Hardy underscores the sexual nature of their interest in the following chapter, 
noting that “Tess was woman enough to realize from their avowals to herself that Angel 
Clare had the honour of all the dairymaids in his keeping” (168) and setting the stage for 
the next day’s encounter between Tess, her friends, and Angel on a Sunday walk. The 
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four young women are walking to church when they encounter a flooded road, which 
presents a challenge because they are dressed in their Sunday best. They are saved from 
soiled dresses by a chance encounter with Angel Clare, who offers to carry each of them 
across the stream to Church unblemished. The obvious sexual metaphor is made more 
explicit through Hardy’s description of the flood and what it means to be dressed in one’s 
“Sunday best”:
[The flooded road] would have been no serious hindrance on a week-day; 
they would have clicked through it in their high pattens and boots quite 
unconcerned; but on this day of vanity, this Sun’s-day, when flesh went 
forth to coquet with flesh while hypocritically affecting business with 
spiritual things; on this occasion for wearing their white stockings and thin 
shoes, and their pink, white, and lilac gowns, on which every mud spot 
would be visible, the pool was an awkward impediment. (169)
The image of the lovesick young women, eagerly waiting for their chance in Clare’s 
arms, sums up all that women of their position can hope for in the existing moral and 
social order: an honorable man who will transport them past natural pitfalls on the road to 
an “upright” society in which piety is really a hypocritical mask that offers an outlet for 
the acceptable expression of sexual urges. Angel’s ability to ford the stream respectably 
reflects his prerogative as a man within the existing order to dabble sexually without 
being socially ruined by it, a fact borne out by his previous experience with an older 
woman in London.18
This sense of the base lurking behind the pious is mirrored in the scene 
immediately before Alec d’Urberville’s deflowering of Tess, as she is walking home from 
the country dance in Traintridge. D’Urberville, unlike Clare, is obviously a man with 
whom no woman’s honor can be trusted, and Hardy’s narrator marks the effects of his 
proximity on the village as a whole:
Every village has its idiosyncrasy, its constitution, often its own code of 
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morality. The levity of some of the younger women in and about 
Traintridge was marked, and was perhaps symptomatic of the choice spirit 
who ruled The Slopes in that vicinity. (89)
Hardy goes on to suggest that Traintridge “had a more abiding defect; it drank 
hard” (89). The rude and drunken behavior of the Traintridge residents is on full display 
as Tess and her companions are returning from a country dance, culminating in an 
attempt by one woman to start a fight with Tess, who is “rescued” by the sudden arrival 
of d’Urberville and spirited away on horseback. Hardy’s description of the villagers, who 
cruelly joke that Tess is “[o]ut of the frying-pan into the fire” (96) reinforces the notion 
that social judgment surrounding sexual behavior is, like the coquetry of the dairymaids’ 
Sunday best, based on a fundamental hypocrisy:
as they went there moved onward with them, around the shadow of each 
one’s head, a circle of opalized light, formed by the moon’s rays upon the 
glistening sheet of dew.Each pedestrian could see no halo but his or her 
own, which never deserted the head-shadow, whatever its vulgar 
unsteadiness might be; but adhered to it, and persistently beautified it; till 
the erratic motions seemed an inherent part of the irradiation, and the 
fumes of their breathing a component of the night’s mist; and the spirit of 
the scene, and of the moonlight, and of Nature, seemed harmoniously to 
mingle with the spirit of wine. (96)
The tragedy of Tess’s experience is that she, unlike the drunken inhabitants of 
Trantridge, is not blinded by the illusory light of her own personal halo. Indeed, Tess is 
inclined to judge herself as harshly as any character in the novel, if not more so. Early on, 
when the family horse Prince, who serves as the real “bread-winner” (59) for the 
household, is killed in an accident while Tess is driving, she receives the most cruel 
treatment at her own hands. This is, in part, because she is more able to understand the 
implications of her actions than her simple parents. As Hardy explains,
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the very shiftlessness of the [Durbeyfield] household rendered the 
misfortune a less terrifying one to them than it would have been to a 
striving family, though in the present case it meant ruin, and in the other it 
would only have meant inconvenience. In the Durbeyfield countenances 
there was nothing of the red wrath that would have burnt upon the girl 
from parents more ambitious for her welfare. Nobody blamed Tess as she 
blamed herself. (58)
Hardy underscores this idea in the scene of the makeshift funeral that Tess’s father holds 
for the horse. Surrounded by her sobbing siblings, Tess’s “face was dry and pale, as 
though she regarded herself in the light of a murderess” (59).
Tess’s overwhelming sense of guilt, in contrast to the vague shiftlessness of her 
parents, stands as a perfect demonstration of the Darwinian narrative of moral 
evolution.19 Darwin suggests that this development requires the “intellectual power” that 
enables an individual “to trace the more remote consequences of his actions,” and a level 
of empathy that would causes the individual to focus on “not only the welfare, but the 
happiness of his fellow-men” (Descent, 103-4). Tess, unlike her parents, has more than 
enough reason and empathy to understand the gravity of the situation and to understand 
the role that she played in bringing it about. Her undoing is the fact that she is unable to 
perceive the role of others in bringing about the tragic circumstances of her life, or the 
hypocrisy of the system that continually adds to her sense of guilt and suffering. Thus she 
punishes herself for her part in the accident without acknowledging the role of others. 
Perhaps most important is the fact that she is not, as Darwin suggests is necessary, 
able to “reject baneful customs and superstitions” (Descent, 103). It is in Tess’s 
experiences with religion that Hardy most explicitly weighs in on the moral questions 
that her story poses.20 We first see this when Tess is fleeing Alec d’Urberville’s estate, 
several weeks after their first sexual encounter. Tess encounters a man with the peculiar 
Sunday habit of wandering the countryside, painting scripture on fences and bridges. 
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When the man stops their conversation to paint “THY, DAMNATION, SLUMBERETH, 
NOT”(108) on a stile, Hardy describes the contrast between the way Tess responds to the 
passage and the way that a more astute reader might:
Some people might have cried ‘Alas, poor Theology’ at the hideous 
defacement - the last grotesque phase of a creed which had served 
mankind well in its time. But the words entered Tess with accusatory 
horror. It was as if this man had known her recent history; yet he was a 
total stranger. (108)
When Tess asks the man what happens “if your sin was not of your own making,” the 
man simply replies that he “cannot split hairs on that burning query”(108). His job, he 
explains, is simply to travel the countryside, painting scripture on fences, barns, and 
signposts where it can be seen by travelers. When Tess comments that the text is 
“horrible....Crushing! Killing!” (108) the man seems delighted to hear it. He leaves no 
doubt as to whom he wishes to be “crushed” or “killed” by the text, moving to a blank 
wall where he intends to put up the text of the Commandment against adultery and telling 
Tess: “I must put one there - one that it will be good for dangerous young females like 
yourself to heed” (109), implying that Tess is dangerous simply because she is sexually 
attractive.
That final comment echoes Hardy's method in Return, laying out the arguments 
made by contemporary Christians and highlighting the defects of those arguments all at 
once. Hardy reduces the Christian approach to sexuality to one in which female sexuality 
is presented as a dangerous force that needs to be “crushed” and “killed” by an equally 
powerful mystical force. Far from acknowledging the complexity of the issue, the man 
simply shirks responsibility, saying that it isn’t his job to “split hairs,” and choosing 
instead to wander the countryside unreflectively parroting things he has heard in the past 
that can serve as an admonishment to those for whom he feels no sympathy.
Significantly, the final advice that the man offers to Tess is that she should take in 
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a sermon from a local preacher, a man who turns out to be Tess’s future father-in-law. 
While the sign-painter says that he is not “of [Clare’s] persuasion now,” he explains of 
the elder Clare, “‘Twas he began the work in me,” (109). For Tess this is significant 
because she will spend the course of the novel at the mercy of two men who receive their 
notion of purity from the elder Clare: Alec d’Urberville and Angel Clare. From the 
Darwinian perspective, the profound effect of Clare’s ideas on the two men is crucial to 
Hardy’s idea of morality because the two men’s actions suggest the way that such a view 
of female sexuality could take hold of society and the pernicious effects of a failure to 
reasonably examine its influence.
D’Urberville’s encounter with the elder Clare occurs sometime between Tess’s 
departure from the Slopes and her ill-fated attempt to ask her in-laws for help while 
Angel is in South America. Returning from that failed trip, Tess discovers Alec in a barn 
delivering a fiery sermon to a group of locals. Hardy is careful to describe d’Urberville’s 
conversion not as a rejection of his past ways, but as the incorporation of his sexual 
energy into a religious framework:
It was less a reform than a transfiguration. The former curves of 
sensuousness were now modulated to lines of devotional passion. The lip-
shapes that had meant seductiveness were now made to express 
supplication. The glow on the cheek that yesterday could be translated as 
riotousness was evangelized to-day into the splendour of pious rhetoric; 
animalism had become fanaticism; Paganism Paulinism; the bold rolling 
eye that had flashed upon her form in the old time with such mastery now 
beamed with the rude energy of a theolatry that was almost ferocious. 
Those black angularities which his face had used to put on when his 
wishes were thwarted now did duty in picturing the incorrigible 
backslider who insisted upon wallowing in the mire. (331)
As with Susan Nunsuch’s understanding of Eustacia’s power as a “witch” and the 
68
need to counter it with demonic assistance, d’Urberville’s conversion suggests something 
fundamental about the origins of society’s understanding of female sexuality. 
D’Urberville’s sermon reveals many of the same assumptions about women, paired with 
the same desire to be “crushing” and “killing” in his rhetoric as the sign-painter. Just as 
the sign-painter suggests that beautiful women like Tess are dangerous, d’Urberville 
assumes that female beauty is a temptation that society must control, as though by simply 
being beautiful Tess is committing a crime. Hardy highlights this in a conversation 
between Tess and d’Urberville shortly after their encounter at the barn:
She turned from the stile over which she had been leaning, and faced him; 
whereupon his eye’s, falling casually upon the familiar countenance and 
form, remained contemplating her. The inferior man was quiet in him 
now; but it was surely not extracted nor even entirely subdued.
‘Don’t look at me like that!’ he said abruptly.
Tess, who had been quite unconscious of her action and mien, 
instantly withdrew the large dark gaze of her eyes, stammering with a 
flush, ‘I beg your pardon!’ And there was revived in her the wretched 
sentiment which had often come to her before, that in inhabiting the 
fleshly tabernacle with which nature had endowed her she was somehow 
doing wrong. (334)
D’Urberville goes on to ask why Tess doesn’t keep her veil down, since she wears it “to 
hide her good looks,” and Tess complies, despite the fact that she was simply wearing the 
veil “to keep off the wind” (334).
Hardy is careful to depict this idea of the perceived danger of female beauty as 
something more ubiquitous than the mistaken notions of a few religious zealots. 
Throughout the novel, Tess suffers as a result of her beauty. When she is first sent to meet 
the d’Urbervilles and petition them for help, Hardy describes the young girl as having “an 
attribute which amounted to a disadvantage...a luxuriance of aspect, a fullness of growth, 
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which made her appear more of a woman than she really was,” adding that she “had 
inherited the feature from her mother without the quality it denoted” (66-7). Ominously, 
Tess’s mature figure (accentuated by the careful primping of her mother) is the very thing 
“that caused Alec d’Urberville’s eyes to rivet themselves upon her” at their first meeting 
(66). Traveling to ask for help from her in-laws, Tess suffers from the same sort of 
attention on the road, in a way that is particularly tied to her social standing: “Whilst the 
clothes lasted which had been prepared for her marriage, these casual glances of interest 
caused her no inconvenience, but as soon as she was compelled to don the wrapper of a 
fieldwoman, rude words were addressed to her more than once” (300). Tess has so 
internalized the notion that she is somehow at fault for the actions of such men that she 
goes to great lengths to obscure her beauty, wearing “one of the oldest field-gowns,” 
covering her face with a handkerchief “as if she were suffering from toothache,” and 
“mercilessly nipp[ing] her eyebrows off” with a pair of scissors (304).
In a society where female beauty can simultaneously be treated with such 
suspicion and casual possessiveness, it is no wonder that Tess finds herself drawn to 
Angel Clare, the man she believes exhibits a “self-controlling sense of duty” in regard to 
the dairymaids who are so infatuated with him, a sense of duty “in the absence of which 
more than one of the simple hearts who were his housemates might have gone weeping 
on her pilgrimage” (168). Crucially, Hardy connects this sense of duty to Clare’s 
metaphysical views, in particular his rejection of religion. Hardy suggests that the purity 
of the dairymaids, including Tess, is safe with Clare because he is “a man with a 
conscience” (183), a conscience that is particularly informed by the idea that there is 
nothing beyond this life and the struggles and joys that one experiences in it:
This consciousness upon which he had intruded was the single opportunity 
ever vouch-safed to Tess by an unsympathetic First Cause - her all; her 
every and only chance. How then should he look upon her as of less 
consequence than himself; as a pretty trifle to caress and grow weary of; 
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and not deal in the greatest seriousness with the affection which he knew 
he had awakened in her - so fervid and so impressionable as she was under 
her reserve; in order that it might not agonize and wreck her? (183)
In this way, Clare’s views are startlingly modern. Unlike d’Urberville, who abandons all 
notions of morality when he decides there is no threat of divine retribution, Clare is 
engaged in the process of constructing a system of morality that does not depend on any 
divine inspiration or regulation. 
Unfortunately for Tess, while Clare may have rejected the rigid theology of his 
father, he has continued to cling to the notion of purity that informs the elder Clare’s 
doctrine. Thus, confronted with her previous sexual experiences, he vehemently and 
cruelly rejects her, despite having revealed his own sexual dalliances only moments 
before. While his own confession is a source of relief, Tess’s revelation amounts, in 
Clare’s view, to a “grotesque...prestidigitation” (255) that reveals her as a completely 
different person than the woman he thought he knew. 
It is at this moment that Hardy most clearly depicts the Darwinian concept of the 
struggle between various learned and instinctive behaviors. The force most clearly 
opposed to Angel’s acceptance of Tess is his notion of purity, learned early on from his 
parents, a fact that he introduces in his own discussion of his sexual experiences: 
Though I imagine my poor father fears that I am one of the eternally lost 
for my doctrines, I am of course, a believer in good morals, Tess, as much 
as you. I used to wish to be a teacher of men, and it was a great 
disappointment to me when I found I could not enter the Church. I 
admired spotlessness, even though I could lay no claim to it, and hated 
impurity, as I hope I do now.Whatever one may think of plenary 
inspiration, one must heartily subscribe to these words of Paul: “Be thou 
an example - in word, in conversation, in charity, in spirit, in faith, in 
purity.” It is the only safeguard for us poor human beings. (251)
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Clare’s insistence on clinging to his understanding of the Pauline idea of purity, even in 
the face of his own agnosticism, suggests that he, like d’Urberville after him, is still 
“confusing theology and morals” (353). Moreover, it accords with Darwin’s notion that 
“absurd rules of conduct, as well as … absurd religious beliefs” that are “constantly 
inculcated during the early years of life, while the brain is impressable[sic]” can “acquire 
almost the nature of an instinct” (Descent, 101). 
In opposition to this powerful force, Hardy presents three possible strategies that 
Tess could use to overcome Angel’s objections, and they rely on the forces that Darwin 
suggests compete for control of moral decisions: base instinct,  reason, and sympathy. 
Hardy outlines the first two in succession, arguing that Tess had an opportunity to defeat 
his arguments and that
It was based on her exceptional physical nature; and she might have used 
it promisingly. She might have added besides: “On an Australian upland or 
Texan plain, who is to know or care about my misfortunes, or to reproach 
me or you?” (269)
Likewise, Hardy repeatedly suggests that Clare’s protestations could be overcome by pity 
for Tess, arguing that beneath his arguments there was “a back current of sympathy 
through which a woman of the world might have conquered him” (267) and observing as 
Angel is leaving that “[i]f Tess had been artful, had she made a scene, fainted, wept 
hysterically, in that lonely lane, notwithstanding the fury of fastidiousness with which he 
was possessed, he would probably not have withstood her” (278). Unfortunately for Tess, 
however, she has long since internalized the idea that she is somehow impure and at fault 
for her situation. And because she is unable to do away with the ideal of purity by which 
she is judged, she perceives that any attempt to persuade Clare might lead to a victory 
that is short-lived at best because “even if these assumed reproaches were not likely to be 
addressed to him or to his by strangers [in Australia or Texas], they might have reached 
his ears from his own fastidious brain” (269).
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Clare’s attachment to an ideal of purity learned from his parents at an early age 
and widely accepted by society around him serves as the focus for Hardy’s project of 
moral husbandry in the novel. Hardy’s exploration of Clare’s unwillingness to accept that 
Tess may, in fact, be “a pure woman,” and the tragic outcome of Tess’s refusal to 
challenge that decision are the twin levers by which Hardy attempts to shift the moral 
center of the reader. While Hardy’s exploration of the social construct of purity creates 
the opportunity to question that construct, Hardy’s narration is peppered with declarations 
as bold as the subtitle of the novel itself, creating the sense that the narrator and reader 
are both aware of deeper truths that evade the characters themselves. 
Meanwhile, Tess is presented as trapped between an instinctive willingness to 
learn from her experiences and move on and a society that refuses to allow her to do so. 
Thus Hardy suggests that without the judgment of society, Tess’s experiences with 
d’Urberville, her pregnancy, the untimely death of her child “would have been simply a 
liberal education” (127). To be certain, it seems reductive to refer such a tragic series of 
events as “a liberal education,” but in doing so, Hardy reveals the limited nature of his 
own optimism. Hardy's project of evolutionary meliorism is precisely that: an attempt to 
ameliorate the suffering of mankind, not by altering what he described in Return as “the 
defects of natural laws” and “the quandary that man is in by their operation,” but rather 
by carefully examining the social systems that have been created in response to the 
operation of those natural laws with an eye toward making the best of a difficult situation. 
Hardy acknowledges that there is no changing the power of sexual attraction, or the fact 
that even briefly giving in to an irrational sexual urge can lead to a lifetime of obligation 
and difficulty. At the same time, he highlights the way that that struggle is compounded 
by a system that hypocritically dismisses a woman like Tess as fallen and inferior.
Hardy suggests that Tess's remorse is based on a fiction endorsed by those around 
her and her acceptance of their judgment, rather than any actual transgression on her part. 
As Hardy explains:
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She might have seen that what had bowed her head so profoundly - the 
thought of the world’s concern at her situation - was founded on an 
illusion. She was not an existence, an experience, a passion, a structure of 
sensations, to anybody but herself. To all humankind besides Tess was 
only a passing thought....Moreover, alone in a desert island would she 
have been wretched at what had happened to her? Not greatly. If she could 
have been but just created, to discover herself as a spouseless mother, with 
no experience of life except as the parent of a nameless child, would the 
position have caused her to despair? No, she would have taken it calmly, 
and found pleasures therein. Most of the misery had been generated by her 
conventional aspect, and not by her innate sensations. (119-20)
Hardy is most pointed when handling the “conventional aspect” of Tess’s 
experience with d’Urberville, explicitly suggesting again and again the disparity between 
perception and reality. In one scene, Tess tortures herself with the notion that she could 
have been with Angel before she ever met d’Urberville, bypassing her downfall and 
eliminating the question of whether revealing her past would cause Alec to despise her. 
Hardy weighs in vehemently, observing that “[i]t was no mature woman with a long dark 
vista of intrigue behind her who was tormented thus; but a girl of simple life, not yet one-
and-twenty, who had been caught during her days of immaturity like a bird in a springe” 
(224).21 Later, when Tess encounters a number of birds who have literally been caught in 
such traps and are dying, Hardy describes her feeling of being a fallen woman as 
“nothing more tangible than a sense of condemnation under an arbitrary law of society 
which had no foundation in Nature” (303).
The tragic outcome of the novel comes from the fact that both Angel and Tess 
only belatedly arrive at the realization to which Hardy’s narrator has led the reader 
throughout the novel. First Angel, wandering the New World, sick and disillusioned, 
finds himself talking to a well-traveled stranger who easily decimates his notion of Tess’s 
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impurity with the one thing Darwin suggests would be necessary to overcome his near-
instinctive understanding of it: reason. To the stranger, Hardy explains, “such deviations 
from the social norm, so immense to domesticity, were no more than are the irregularities 
of vale and mountain-chain to the whole terrestrial curve” (36). Thus, the stranger 
explains, Clare was wrong to reject his wife because “what Tess had been was of no 
importance beside what she would be” (363).
Angel’s response to this argument is to approach the values he has taken for 
granted in a new light, putting them to a test of logic that they promptly fail:
His inconsistencies rushed upon him in a flood. he had persistently 
elevated Hellenic Paganism at the expense of Christianity; yet in that 
civilization an illegal surrender was not certain dis-esteem. Surely then he 
might have regarded that abhorrence of the un-intact state, which he had 
inherited with the creed of mysticism, as at least open to correction when 
the result was due to treachery. (364)
The passage perfectly encapsulates Darwin’s description of persistent superstitions and 
customs acting as inherited “instincts,” surmountable only by the application of logic and 
sympathy. In this way, it provides a sort of case study for the reader in the deliberate act 
of moral husbandry.
Hardy emphasizes the importance of examining these assumptions about purity by 
presenting Tess’s situation as part of something universal in contemporary society. Tess, 
suffering and alone in England, finally disabuses herself of the notion that Angel is a 
perfect man who will serve as her salvation and pens a brief letter to her husband in 
which she observes that she can never forgive him before ultimately giving in to Alec 
d’Urberville’s argument that being his mistress is the only way she can provide for her 
family. In this way, Tess finally gives in to an existing social order that hypocritically 
sanctions such behavior as a way for women to gain comfort at the expense of social 
dignity.22 
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This pseudo-prostitution is the reason Joan Durbeyfield deliberately sends Tess to 
her first meeting with Alec d’Urberville in a dress that “imparted to her developing figure 
an amplitude which belied her age, and might cause her to be estimated as a woman when
she was not much more than a child” (70). Joan's attempt to increase her daughter's 
sexual appeal is a transparent attempt to use the girl as a replacement bread-winner for 
the family by securing a marriage to d'Urberville. Indeed, when the girl returns home 
pregnant and single, her mother expresses with frustration that she “ought to have been 
more careful if [she] didn't mean to get him to make [her] his wife!” (110). Tess, for her 
part, was so unaware of the nature of sexuality, pregnancy, and their relationship to 
marriage that she responds to her mother in exasperation: “I was a child when I left this 
house four months ago. Why didn't you tell me there was danger in men-folk?” (111). In 
her innocence, Tess had viewed her move to The Slopes only in terms of the pressure to 
support her family through gainful employment.
 The effect of this pressure on Tess is clear in her early encounters with 
d’Urberville. When he gives her “the kiss of mastery” (74) while driving her to his estate, 
Tess cannot bring herself to consider going home because she cannot imagine having to 
face her parents after abandoning her position at The Slopes “on such sentimental 
grounds” (80). After she has been at the d’Urberville estate for  a few days, she finds 
herself less shy around Alec, although she experiences no feelings toward him “which 
could engender shyness of a new and tenderer kind” (87). All the same, Tess is “more 
pliable under his hands than a mere companionship would have made her, owing to the 
unavoidable dependence upon his mother, and … upon him” (87).
 This idea of Tess’s submission to d’Urberville being a sort of socially-sanctioned 
prostitution is further supported by d’Urberville himself, who acknowledges that he owes 
Tess compensation as she is leaving The Slopes:
I am ready to pay to the uttermost farthing. You know you need not work 
in the fields or the dairies again. You know you may clothe yourself with 
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the best, instead of in the bald plain way you have lately affected, as if you 
couldn’t get a ribbon more than you earn. (106)
D’Urberville implicitly admits that this largesse is payment for sex when he suggests that 
sex was the whole reason for his flattery and pursuit of Tess. He also acknowledges a 
further obligation if she becomes pregnant, saying that “if certain circumstances should 
arise - you understand - in which you are in the least need, the least difficulty, send me 
one line, and you shall have by return whatever you require” (106).  Along with this frank 
admission comes an encouragement to exploit such transactions to her advantage:
I have no reason for flattering you now, and I can say plainly that you need 
not be so sad. You can hold your own for beauty against any woman of 
these parts, gentle or simple; I say it to you as a practical man and well-
wisher. If you are wise you will show it to the world more than you do 
before it fades. (107)
In this way, d’Urberville is able to be the mouthpiece for both sides of the trap 
that Hardy suggests Victorian notions of purity and female sexuality present for women. 
On the one hand, he encourages her to rise up from poverty by cynically exploiting her 
sexual appeal and giving herself physically to a man she does not love. By the time he 
encounters her again, he adds to the chorus of condemnation that has dogged her since 
her pregnancy, suggesting that not only should she be ashamed of her sexual experience, 
she should view her own beauty as something shameful and dangerous, to be hidden from 
the world. In the end, Tess gives in to the former argument and becomes his mistress 
because doing so offers her family relief from poverty after they are evicted from their 
home (a difficulty which only arises after her neighbors are scandalized by her tending to 
the grave of her child). Angel Clare’s new morality, hamstrung as it is by the influence of 
his parents’ “mysticism,” has nothing to offer a woman who does not live up to the 
abstract ideal that he had convinced himself Tess represented.
This, then, is the gauntlet that Hardy throws down for his readers with Tess. Angel
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Clare’s failings make it clear that there can be no real progress for women like Tess 
without a re-examination of the fundamental logic of what it means to be “pure” in 
contemporary society. Hardy leads the reader, and eventually Clare himself, through that 
re-examination, laying out the logical flaws behind the traditional concept of purity, but 
not in time to save Tess. Tess, like all of Hardy’s tragic protagonists, must be sacrificed in 
order to arouse the maximum amount of sympathy in the Darwinian struggle within the 
reader’s own mind as he or she contemplates the moral question that Hardy places before 
them.23
As Hardy’s career progressed, he became more forceful in his use of tragedy as a 
way to arouse the sympathy of the reader. While the deaths of Eustacia Vye and her 
mother in-law are certainly moving, the difficulties of their day-to-day lives seem as 
nothing compared to the suffering of Tess Durbeyfield. In Jude the Obscure, however, 
Hardy seems determined to outdo himself, pushing the suffering of his characters to a 
level that still seems shocking by modern standards. At its heart, though, the tragedy of 
Jude Fawley and Sue Bridehead is rooted in the same framework as Hardy's earlier 
tragedies. Jude’s moral progress, like that of Angel Clare and, to a lesser extent, Clym 
Yeobright, is inextricably linked to his gradual rejection of theology and his attempt to 
craft a morality in its absence. And, like Yeobright and Clare, he is ultimately undone by 
the opposition of a society that clings to an irrational understanding of sexuality and the 
moral imperatives that surround it.
Fawley’s first encounter with Arabella Donn, his future wife, begins with a literal 
intrusion of the phallic on his daydreams of intellectual pursuits, in the form of a pig’s 
penis thrown at him over a hedge by the forward Arabella Donn. As Hardy develops the 
relationship between Jude and Arabella, he repeatedly describes the conflict between 
Jude's irrational, instinctive interest in Arabella and his rational realization that there is 
little about her to interest him besides sexual appeal. Fawley dismisses his own 
reservations, insisting to himself that talking to Arabella is “only a bit of fun” (65), while 
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at the same he is dimly aware
that there was something lacking...in the nature of this girl who had drawn 
him to her, which made it necessary that he should assert mere 
sportiveness on his part as his reason in seeking her; something in her 
quite antipathetic to that side of him which had been occupied with literary 
study and the magnificent Christminster dream. (65)
In this way, Jude resembles Clym and the other men who fall under the “spell” of 
Eustacia Vye. Indeed, Hardy goes on to explain that Jude perceives these things about 
Arabella “with his intellectual eye, just for a short fleeting while, as by the light of a 
falling lamp one might momentarily see an inscription on a wall before being enshrouded 
in darkness” (65). After that, it is clear that Jude’s base instincts have won control of his 
decisions and that he is as much Arabella’s automaton as Johnny Nunsuch is Eustacia’s:
In short, as if materially, a compelling arm of extraordinary muscular 
power seized hold of him, something which had nothing in common with 
the spirits and influences that had moved him hitherto. This seemed to 
care little for his reason and his will, nothing of his so-called elevated 
intentions, and moved him along, as a violent schoolmaster a schoolboy he 
has seized by the collar, in a direction which tended towards the embrace 
of a woman for whom he had no respect and whose life had nothing in 
common with his own except locality. (67-8)
Arabella, unlike Tess, shows no hesitation in exploiting the existing social order. 
She feigns pregnancy in order to secure Jude’s hand in marriage, an outcome that is 
desirable precisely because of the material advantages that marriage can confer: 
she had gained a husband; that was the thing - a husband with a lot of 
earning power in him for buying her frocks and hats when he should begin 
to get frightened a bit, and stick to his trade, and throw aside those stupid 
books for practical undertakings. (82)
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Jude, for his part, realizes that Arabella “was not worth a great deal as a specimen 
of womankind,” but he ultimately marries her because it was “the custom of the rural 
districts among honourable young men who had drifted so far into intimacy with a 
woman as he unfortunately had done” (80-1). Like Tess, Jude finds himself trapped 
between the urgings of nature and a social convention created in response to those 
urgings that is, at its heart, illogical. Interestingly, Hardy’s description of that trap is 
centered around the way that social conventions prevent evolutionary progress:
There seemed to him, vaguely and dimly, something wrong in a social 
ritual which made necessary a canceling of well-formed schemes 
involving years of thought and labour, of forgoing a man’s one opportunity 
of showing himself superior to the lower animals, and of contributing his 
units of work to the general progress of his generation, because of a 
momentary surprise by a new and transitory instinct which had nothing in 
it of the nature of vice, and could be only at the most called weakness. He 
was inclined to inquire what he had done, or she lost, for that matter, that 
he deserved to be caught in a gin which would cripple him, if not her also, 
for the rest of a lifetime. (85)24
Hardy sharpens his criticism of Jude’s obligation to marry Arabella when it becomes 
clear that their marriage is rendered untenable by their fundamental differences. “Their 
lives were ruined,” Hardy observes,  “by the fundamental error of their matrimonial 
union: that of having based a permanent contract on a temporary feeling which had no 
necessary connection with affinities that alone render a life-long comradeship possible” 
(64).
After his separation from Arabella and his initial encounter with his cousin, Sue 
Bridehead, Jude continues his moral development, with sexuality and matrimony serving 
as the focal point for his ongoing examination of the intersection of theology and 
morality. When, in a moment of passion, he kisses Sue, he realizes that he is at a crucial 
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turning point, at which he must either abandon his religious convictions or abandon his 
love for Sue:
He saw one thing: that though his kiss of that aerial being had seemed to 
him the purest moment of his faultful life, as long as he nourished this 
unlicensed tenderness it was glaringly inconsistent for him to pursue the 
idea of becoming a soldier and servant of a religion in which sexual love 
was regarded as at its best a frailty, and at its worst damnation. (233)
Reflecting on the influence of women on his ever-changing moral system, Jude once 
again returns to the image of the prevailing social order as a sort of trap, wondering to 
himself if the problem isn’t actually “the artificial system of things, under which the 
normal sex-impulses are turned into devilish domestic gins and springes” (234). 
Ultimately, Jude comes to reject this “artificial system,” concluding that “People go on 
marrying because they can’t resist natural forces, although many of them may know 
perfectly well that they are possibly buying a month’s pleasure with a life’s discomfort” 
(273).
Jude’s thinking on the subject owes much to his own experience with Arabella, 
but also to Sue, who acts as a sort of mentor to him. Sue’s own marriage to Jude’s 
childhood schoolteacher, Phillotson, is also the product of the pressure to look 
respectable, though in her case it is an attempt to avoid false accusations of sexual 
impropriety. Unlike Jude, Sue does not find herself attached to a person that she cannot 
respect or who does not respect her. Rather, Sue’s marital difficulty stems from her 
recognition of the fact that the marriage contract is understood as guaranteeing Phillotson 
access to her body:
What tortures me so much is the necessity of being responsive to this man 
whenever he wishes, good as he is morally! - the dreadful contract to feel 
in a particular way in a matter whose essence is its voluntariness...I wish 
he would beat me, or be faithless to me, or do some open thing that I could 
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talk about as a justification for feeling as I do! (230)
At the heart of Sue’s protestations is the fact that she has come to understand that 
which eluded Angel Clare through most of Tess: contemporary notions of purity, 
matrimony, and Sue’s sexual duties as a wife are derived from a primitive, mystical 
understanding of the world which serves to obscure the more practical purposes of the 
arrangement. Sue tries out this argument in a conversation with Jude about her 
experiences with Phillotson, wondering if it is wrong “for a husband or wife to tell a third 
person that they are unhappy in their marriage?” (227). Her answer hinges on the 
question of whether or not there is truly a supernatural element to the sacrament of 
marriage:
If a marriage ceremony is a religious  thing, it is possibly wrong; but if it 
is only a sordid contract, based on material convenience in householding, 
rating and taxing, and the inheritance of land and money by children 
making it necessary that the male parent should be known, which it seems 
to be - why surely a person may say, even proclaim upon the housetops 
that it hurts or grieves him or her? (227)
Ultimately, Sue decides that marriage is, in fact, nothing more than a “sordid contract,” 
noting that “[w]hen people of a later age look back upon the barbarous customs and 
superstitions of the times that we have the unhappiness to live in, what they will say!” 
(232).
Sue’s arguments, like those of the nameless stranger that Angel Clare encounters 
in the New World, seem to be directed simultaneously at the reader and at her fellow 
characters. And, like the stranger, Sue is persuasive, at least to Phillotson, through the 
combination of empathy and reason prescribed by Darwin as a remedy for superstition 
and ignorance. In an outburst that neatly sums up her entire argument, Sue asks of 
Phillotson, “What is the use of thinking of laws and ordinances....if they make you 
miserable when you are committing no sin?” (239). Interestingly, the philosopher she 
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turns to for support in her argument is Mill, citing a passage that parallels Jude’s earlier 
questions about “social rituals” and their ability to cancel a man’s ability to “[show] 
himself superior to the lower animals.” The quotation from Mill once again draws 
attention to the connection between evolution, superstition, and faulty social systems:
Sue continued: “She, or he, 'who lets the world, or his own portion of it, 
choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the 
ape-like one of imitation.' J.S. Mill’s words, those are. I have been reading 
it up. Why can’t you act upon them? I wish to, always.” (239)
While Phillotson is not immediately persuaded by Sue’s rational assault on the 
religious basis of marriage, his sympathy is ultimately aroused by the extremity of Sue’s 
sexual aversion to him. Having moved to separate bedrooms, Phillotson accidentally goes 
to Sue’s room while distracted with his work one night, a mistake that causes Sue to leap 
out of a second floor window in her haste to escape him. This, contrasted with her 
feelings about Jude (at one point Phillotson remarks to his friend Gillingham that Jude 
and Sue “seem to be one person split in two!” (245)), serves to convince Phillotson that 
Jude and Sue should be together, even though he “can’t logically, or religiously, defend 
[his] concession to such a wish of hers; or harmonize it with the doctrines [he] was 
brought up in” (246).
As in Tess, Hardy structures his narration around the expectation that the reader is  
working through the same assessment as Phillotson, taking care to weigh in explicitly on 
behalf of Jude and Sue as a couple. In his discussion with Gillingham, Phillotson argues 
that Jude and Sue’s “supreme desire is to be together - to share each other’s emotions, and 
fancies, and dreams” (247). As Jude and Sue struggle with their uncertainty about getting 
married or simply living together unwed, Hardy confirms Phillotson’s earlier impressions 
about the loving nature of their relationship, observing that the fact “[t]hat the twain were 
happy - between their times of sadness - was indubitable” and going so far as to suggest 
that the sudden and unexpected arrival of Father Time, Jude’s son from his first marriage,
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“brought into their lives a new and tender interest of an ennobling and unselfish kind” 
and “rather helped than injured their happiness” (301). 
The fair at Stoke-Barehills, with its unexpected encounter with Arabella and her 
new Australian husband, offers a chance to contrast Jude and Sue’s relationship with the 
more typical relationship of the Cartletts. Jude and Sue are presented as the very picture 
of domestic bliss:
Sue, in her new summer clothes, flexible and light as a bird...went along as 
if she hardly touched ground, and as if a moderately strong puff of wind 
would float her over the hedge into the next field. Jude...was really proud 
of her companionship, not more for her external attractiveness than for her 
sympathetic words and ways. That complete mutual understanding, in 
which every glance and movement was as effectual as speech for 
conveying intelligence between them, made them almost two parts of a 
single whole. (304)
Arabella and Cartlett, meanwhile, are depicted as uncaring and quarrelsome, a 
demeanor that Hardy describes as “the antipathetic, recriminatory mood of the 
average husband and wife of Christendom” (308).
This “antipathetic, recriminatory mood” has its origins in the faults of the 
contemporary marriage contract that Sue and Jude have already debated, a fact which 
Hardy reaffirms in an earlier scene, when Sue and Jude set out to get married after the 
arrival of Jude's child from his first marriage, Father Time. At the Superintendent 
Registrar’s Office, they observe two couples waiting to get married. One couple, 
consisting of an “ill-favoured man, closely cropped, with a broad-faced, pockmarked 
woman on his arm, ruddy with liquor and the satisfaction of being on the brink of a 
gratified desire” (297), reinforces Jude’s notion of marriage as a contract that people enter 
because “they can’t resist natural forces” (273). The other couple seems to confirm Sue’s 
impression of marriage as “a sordid contract, based on material contrivance,” (227): “The 
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soldier was sullen and reluctant: the bride sad and timid; she was soon, obviously, to 
become a mother, and she had a black eye” (296). Sue, in an argument that seems as 
much intended for the reader as for Jude, offers this assessment of the two couples in 
defense of their own decision to leave the office unwed:
How terrible that scene was to me! The expression in that flabby woman’s 
face, leading her on to give herself to that gaol-bird, not for a few hours, as 
she would,but for a lifetime, as she must. And the other poor soul - to 
escape a nominal shame which was owing to the weakness of her 
character, degrading herself to the real shame of bondage to a tyrant who 
scorned her - a man whom to avoid for ever was her only chance of 
salvation(297-8).
Sue’s description of the two unfortunate women is striking, in that she could as easily be 
describing Tess Durbeyfield or Thomasin Yeobright.
Lest the reader suspect that Hardy is only commenting on the marriage of the 
poorer, less respectable members of society, Hardy follows this scene with a trip to the 
local church, where they watch another wedding from a back pew. While the service 
lacks the overt dysfunction of the two marriages at the registrar’s office, it seems clear 
that there is something ominous about the bride's attitude toward the ceremony:
The contracting couple appeared to belong to the well-to-do middle class, 
and the wedding altogether was of ordinary prettiness and interest. They 
could see the flowers tremble in the bride’s hand, even at that distance, 
and could hear her mechanical murmur of words whose meaning her brain 
seemed to gather not at all under the pressure of her self-consciousness 
(298).
The passage suggests something insidious about the pressures involved in maintaining 
traditional middle-class respectability. The young bride's “self-consciousness” suggests 
the influence of social pressures so profound that she is unable to rationally apprehend the 
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scene around her or its significance, reducing her to the unconscious recitation of 
sentiments that she is expected to express by those around her.
Hardy’s final tool in his argument about the nature of the marriage contract is the 
person who understands and exploits the existing system so well: Arabella. While Tess 
Durbeyfield and Thomasin Yeobright recoil in horror from their disillusioned views of 
marriage, Arabella is much more pragmatic. As she explains to Sue: 
Life with a man is more business-like after [marriage], and money matters 
work better. And then, you see, if you have rows, and he turns you out of 
doors, you can get the law to protect you, which you can’t otherwise, 
unless he half runs you through with a knife, or cracks your noodle with a 
poker. And if he bolts away from you - I say it friendly, as woman to 
woman, for there’s never any knowing what a man med do - you’ll have 
the sticks o’furniture, and won’t be looked upon as a thief. (283)
Despite having reduced marriage to the notion of exactly such a contract in an earlier 
conversation, Sue is horrified by Arabella’s argument, returning to Jude to exclaim that it 
has “made [her] feel more than ever how hopelessly vulgar an institution legal marriage 
is - a sort of trap to catch a man” (285).
Arabella’s notion of marriage gets an even darker treatment in her prescriptions to 
Phillotson, to whom she offers advice on his failed marriage:
Yes [Sue wanted to leave]. But you shouldn’t have let her. That’s the only 
way with these fanciful women that chaw high - innocent or guilty. She’d 
have come round in time. We all do! Custom does it! it’s all the same in 
the end! However, I think she’s fond of her man still - whatever he med be 
of her. You were too quick about her. I shouldn’t have let her go! I should 
have kept her chained on - her spirit for kicking would have been broke 
soon enough. There’s nothing like bondage and a stone-deaf task-master 
for taming us women. Besides, you’ve got the laws on your side. Moses 
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knew. (328)
Arabella goes on to cite Scripture to Phillotson: “‘Then shall the man be guiltless; but the 
woman shall bear her iniquity.”  Damn rough on us women; but we must grin and put up 
wi’ it!” (328-9). 
Coupled with Jude and Sue’s arguments and the circumstantial evidence of the 
marriages around them, this passage represents the most explicit argument that Hardy 
makes on a subject that he returned to throughout his career. And, as with Return and 
Tess before it, the argument in Jude is couched in the familiar Darwinian framework of 
the conflict between reason, sympathy, sexuality, superstition, and the customs produced 
by that superstition. As in the earlier novels, Hardy’s narrator is careful to offer explicit 
support for Jude and Sue’s viewpoint, suggesting repeatedly that they are the exceptional 
couple precisely because they are loving and happy and offering a parade of couples who 
fit Hardy's pessimistic description of typical married life. And, as in the earlier novels, 
Hardy pairs this rational argument with the emotional hook of tragedy, allowing the 
social order around Jude and Sue to punish them for their refusal to conform, deepening 
the sympathetic connection between the reader and the characters and encouraging the 
reader to reflect on why it is that there is no space for Jude and Sue in contemporary 
society. 
Jude and Sue’s downfall begins after the agricultural fair where they encountered 
Arabella and Cartlett, when their neighbors begin to have suspicions about the legitimacy 
of their marriage:
The society of Spring Street and the neighborhood generally did not 
understand, and probably could not have been made to understand, Sue 
and Jude’s private minds, emotions, positions, and fears. The curious facts 
of a child coming to them unexpectedly, who called Jude father and Sue 
mother, and a hitch in the marriage ceremony intended for quietness to be 
performed at a registrar’s office, together with rumors of the undefended 
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cases [their divorces from Arabella and Phillotson, respectively] bore only 
one translation to plain minds. (310)
This judgment, made in complete indifference to the actual quality of their relationship, 
translates to an immediate effect on the couple in their day-to-day lives, beginning with 
simple gestures, like the refusal of “neighbouring artizans’ wives” to meet their eyes as 
they pass, and “the baker’s lad and the grocer’s boy” leaving off their habit of tipping 
their hats to Sue as they pass (310). Unfortunately for Jude and Sue, their highly 
developed social instincts and sense of empathy make them particularly sensitive targets 
for such treatment, as Hardy explains:
Nobody molested them, it is true; but an oppressive atmosphere began to 
encircle their souls, particularly after their excursion to the [Agricultural] 
Show, as if that visit had brought some evil influence to bear on them; and 
their temperaments were precisely of a kind to suffer from this 
atmosphere, and to be indisposed to lighten it by vigorous and open 
statements. (311)
As in the cases of Thomasin and Tess, Jude and Sue’s degraded social status also 
has a very real effect on their material well-being, an effect that is worsened by Jude and 
Sue’s own good nature. When Jude is dismissed from a contract doing work on a local 
church because of his relationship with Sue, he refuses “to make any fuss,” (315), arguing 
that he “wouldn’t wish to injure [his employer’s] trade-connection by staying” (315). 
Shortly afterward, Jude is dismissed from his position on the committee of the local 
Artizans’ Mutual Improvement Society. Hardy describes the society as a group of “young 
men of all creeds and denominations, including Churchmen, Congregationalists, Baptists, 
Unitarians, Positivists, and others,” adding that “[a]gnostics had scarcely been heard of at 
this time” (315-6). The expulsion of Jude from such a nominally progressive group 
suggests the same threat of outdated moral codes and customs that led the large-minded 
Angel Clare to reject Tess based on the unconscious effect of his father’s theology. It also 
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underscores the desperate situation in which Sue and Jude find themselves, as they seem 
to be well beyond the vanguard of contemporary political and moral philosophy.
The final blow for Jude and Sue comes in the form of the murder-suicide of their 
children, which happens shortly after Sue confirms Father Time's suspicion that they have 
been refused lodging “because of us children” (342) and the ensuing revelation that Sue 
is expecting another child. The suicidal Father Time, with his one-line note of 
explanation, “Done because we are too meny[sic]” (345) becomes the symbol of Jude and 
Sue’s struggle to defy social convention throughout the novel and the vengeance that 
society takes on them for doing so:
The boy’s face expressed the whole tale of their situation. On that little 
shape had converged all the inauspiciousness and shadow which had 
darkened the first union of Jude, and all the accidents, mistakes, fears, 
errors of the last. He was their nodal point, their focus, their expression in 
a single term. For the rashness of those parents he had groaned, for their 
ill-assortment he had quaked, and for the misfortunes of these he had died. 
(346)
This final line is crucial. While Father Time’s groaning and quaking are produced by the 
foolish union of Jude and Arabella, founded on a dishonest exploitation of existing 
customs, his death is attributed to the misfortunes of Jude and Sue, misfortunes that result 
primarily from the approbation of society due to an illogical social standard rather than 
their merits as a couple. It is society's disapproval of Jude and Sue that keeps Jude from 
work, driving him to work in the rain so that he becomes ill. The same disapproval keeps 
Sue from supporting the family by teaching and ultimately keeps them from gaining 
decent lodging in a rainstorm. At every step of the way, a rational assessment of the 
couple could have prevented their misfortunes, and with them the death of their children.
For Sue, this event is the impetus for a wholesale rejection of everything she 
believed, an atavistic reaction triggered by her own sense of guilt and loss:
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Vague and quaint imaginings had haunted Sue in the days when her 
intellect had scintillated like a star, that the world resembled a stanza or 
melody composed in a dream; it was wonderfully excellent to the half-
aroused intelligence, but hopelessly absurd at the full waking; that the 
First Cause worked automatically like a somnambulist, and not 
reflectively like a sage; that at the framing of the terrestrial conditions 
there seemed never to have been contemplated such a development of 
emotional perceptiveness among the creatures subject to those conditions 
as that reached by thinking and educated humanity. But affliction makes 
opposing forces loom anthropomorphous; and those ideas were now 
exchanged for a sense of Jude and herself fleeing from a persecutor. (351)
This passage contains the clearest elucidation of the bedrock principles beneath Sue’s 
beliefs, and it comes only as she rejects them. Sue’s notion of the “somnambulist” First 
Cause is strikingly similar to the Hardy’s description of the unconscious Immanent Will 
of The Dynasts, just as her process of creating a judgmental God out of her suffering and 
guilt is similar to Tess’s conversion of a “wet day” to “the expression of irremediable 
grief at her weakness in the mind of some vague ethical being.”
When Sue, acting on this anthropomorphized sense of “opposing forces,” insists 
that she and Jude “must conform!” and that “the ancient wrath of the Power above us has 
been vented upon us, His poor creatures, and we must submit,” (351), Jude does his best 
to argue with her, pointing out that they are not in fact “fighting against God,” as Sue 
suggests, but “against man and senseless circumstance,” (351). Sue acknowledges the 
fact, noting that she is “getting as superstitious as a savage,” but at the same time says 
that “whoever or whatever [their] foe may be,” she has “no more fighting strength left; no 
more enterprize” (351). All of the arguments made by Hardy’s narrator to this point have 
prepared the reader to see things from Jude’s point of view, a decision made easier by the 
pathos of Sue’s needless suffering.
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That suffering is increased, rather than lessened, by Sue’s deepening religious 
convictions, which only provide things for her to despise about herself. Sue begins to 
insist that she and Jude “should mortify the flesh - the terrible flesh - the curse of Adam!” 
(353), going so far at one point as to suggest that she “cannot humiliate [herself] too 
much” and that she “should like to prick [herself] all over with pins and bleed out the 
badness that’s in [her]” (354). Ultimately, Sue announces her intention to leave Jude for 
Phillotson in order to accomplish this mortification of the flesh and rejoin the man she 
has come to believe she is married to in the eyes of Heaven.
In this way, Sue's self-sacrifice is different, and perhaps more shocking, than those
which led Thomasin Yeobright to marry the unworthy Damon Wildeve in Return, and  
Tess to become Alec d’Urberville’s mistress. Thomasin's choice to return to Wildeve after 
she is jilted is an attempt to regain the respectability of both herself and her family, while 
Tess's decision to become d'Urberville's mistress is motivated by the material needs of her 
mother and younger siblings. Sue, however, is focused on neither her material needs nor 
on the judgment of those around her. Instead, she is convinced that all of the tragedy of 
her time with Jude is the product of divine judgment, a notion that would have been 
utterly foreign to the Sue Bridehead of earlier years. Hardy explicitly describes this 
change in Sue as the upending of her internal moral calculus, noting that “[t]he blow of 
bereavement seemed to have destroyed her reasoning faculty” (368), a change which 
ultimately brings about “the self-sacrifice of the woman on the altar of what she was 
pleased to call her principles” (395). This sacrifice is all the more tragic because she 
repeatedly asserts that she still loves Jude, both to Jude himself (359) and later to Widow 
Edlin (399). The fact is ultimately confirmed by the always-perceptive Arabella, who, at 
Jude’s funeral, asserts that Sue has “never found peace since she left [Jude’s] arms, and 
never will again again till she’s as he is now!”(413).
For Phillotson, the other victim of society’s inability to understand the new ideas 
on which Jude and Sue have been acting, Sue's decision to leave Jude creates a complex 
91
moral dilemma. “No man had ever suffered more inconvenience from his own charity, 
Christian or heathen,” Hardy argues, “than Phillotson in letting Sue go” (365). He 
continues:
He had been knocked about from pillar to post at the hands of the virtuous 
almost beyond endurance; he had been nearly starved, and was now 
dependent entirely upon the very small stipend from the school of this 
village where the parson had got ill-spoken of for befriending him. He had 
often thought of Arabella’s remarks that he should have been more severe 
with Sue, that her recalcitrant spirit would soon have been broken. Yet 
such was his obstinate and illogical disregard of opinion, and of the 
principles in which he had been trained, that his convictions on the 
rightness of his course with his wife had not been disturbed. (365)
Despite this conviction, however, Phillotson agrees to take Sue back as his wife, a 
decision worth examining in detail. 
At first glance, Phillotson's willingness to accept Sue seems like a decision driven 
by social advantage, not unlike Thomasin's decision to marry Damon Wildeve in Return. 
Certainly Phillotson is experiencing a similar punishment at the hands of his fellow man, 
as Hardy explains in his description of the schoolteacher's motivations: 
[A]rtifice was necessary, he had found, for stemming the cold and 
inhumane blast of the world's contempt. And here were the materials ready 
made. By getting Sue back and re-marrying her on the respectable plea of 
having entertained erroneous views of her [a reference to the claim in their 
divorce suit that Jude and Sue had slept together while Sue was still 
married], and gained his divorce wrongfully, he might acquire some 
comfort, resume his old courses, perhaps return to the Shaston school, if 
not even to the Church as a licentiate. (365)
At the same time, Phillotson's position is somewhat more complicated than that of 
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Thomasin or Tess. Hardy carefully honed his depiction of the schoolteacher's decision to 
re-marry Sue, making revisions with each successive edition of the novel to increase the 
sense of Phillotson as a deeply conflicted man rather than simply being a principled man 
who has abandoned his modern ideas in the face of social pressure.
Hardy depicts this conflict as the result of something fundamental about 
Phillotson himself, an instinctive trait that has a profound effect on his moral decision-
making. This “obstinate and illogical disregard of opinion, and of the principles in which 
he had been trained” (365) leads him into conflict with those who would argue against his 
re-marrying Sue. Thus, Hardy observes, “[t]he instincts which had allowed him to give 
Sue her  liberty now enabled him to regard her as none the worse for her life with Jude” 
(365). 
Phillotson's decision-making process is also clearly influenced by another, more 
primal instinct: his sexual interest in Sue. Hardy hints at this in his discussion of 
Phillotson's instinctive unconventionality, explaining that Phillotson “wished for [Sue] 
still, in his curious way, if he did not love her, and apart from policy, soon felt that he 
would be gratified to have her again as his, always provided she came willingly” (365). 
Phillotson himself seems uncomfortable with admitting the role of his physical interest in 
Sue. While he describes her as “a luxury for a fogey like [himself]” (373), he struggles to 
explain to others why he chooses to re-marry. When Phillotson is discussing Sue's return 
with his friend Gillingham, Hardy observes that Phillotson “did not care to admit clearly 
that his taking Sue to him again had at bottom nothing to do with repentance of letting 
her go, but was, primarily, a human instinct flying in the face of custom and profession” 
(354). The aging schoolteacher is thus caught between a survival instinct that pushes him 
toward the chance to regain respectability and employment, a physical interest that can be 
gratified, an instinctive unconventionality and a highly developed sense of empathy. And 
while the latter two elements of his character exert a powerful pull, causing him to 
suspect on his wedding day “for the second or third time” that “he was not quite 
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following out the humane instinct which had induced him to let [Sue] go” (376), he 
ultimately takes her back. 
At the wedding, the man who gives Sue away is Phillotson's friend Gillingham, 
one of the people who first argued against Phillotson's plan to take her back. This is 
particularly interesting because Gillingham serves as the voice of traditional middle-class 
respectability and morality in the novel. Rather than suggesting that Phillotson should not 
marry Sue because she was unfaithful, or because she is tainted by her experience with 
Jude, Gillingham initially offers an unexpected defense of Sue and Jude's romance:
Gillingham replied, naturally, that now she was gone it were best to let her 
be; and considered that if she were anybody's wife she was the wife of the 
man to whom she had borne three children and owed such tragical 
adventures. Probably, as his attachment to her seemed unusually strong, 
the singular pair would make their union legal in course of time, and all 
would be well, and decent, in order. (366)
This argument serves to underscore the bizarre nature of Jude and Sue's situation. While 
they have been treated as though they committed an unnatural and unforgivable sin, 
Gillingham suggests that everything could be erased with a quick trip to the courthouse, 
an argument that raises the question of why they should have been treated so harshly by 
their neighbors in the first place. This argument is made more explicitly by the Widow 
Edlin in her attempts to dissuade Sue from marrying Phillotson:
Pshoo! You be t' other man's. If you didn't like to commit yourselves to the 
binding vow again, just as first 'twas all the more credit to your 
consciences, considering your reasons, and you med ha' lived on, and 
made it all right at last. After all, it concerned nobody but your own two 
selves. (372)
Unfortunately for Sue (and Jude), her profound sense of being the target of God's wrath 
precludes her noticing that she has merely been the target of her neighbors' callousness 
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and judgment, much less the fact that their approbation could be eliminated if she chose 
to marry Jude. As such, she views her return to Phillotson, her true husband in the eyes of 
God, as the only way to begin the process of atonement, a process that will ultimately 
lead her to what Jude describes as “a fanatic prostitution”(368). 
Sue’s atavistic turn to religious zealotry is one of the most stunning developments 
in any of Hardy’s tragic novels, perhaps because there is such a distance between Sue’s 
views at the beginning of the book and those that she claims to hold at the end, and 
perhaps because at her most extreme, Sue represents a more distant position on the 
evolutionary continuum than any of Hardy’s other forward-thinking protagonists.25 Clym 
Yeobright, for instance, is presented as expressing ideas that are common to urban 
intellectuals of his time, which predates the novel's publication by half a century. Angel 
Clare’s worldview, translated through Tess to Alec d’Urberville is described as typical of 
the work of Mill or Voltaire, placing him squarely in the intellectual conversation of 
Clym’s era, as well. Sue, on the other hand, is different. While her principles are similar 
to those of Clym and Angel, she comes the closest to elucidating the ideas that Hardy 
himself would most clearly explain in the “Apology” and The Dynasts. Likewise, she 
seems far less encumbered by the sort of  superstition that influences both Clare and 
Yeobright, at least until her final regression. And the stand that she takes in living with 
Jude unmarried is definitely a more daring application of principle than either man 
hazards in the earlier novels. For this reason, an examination of what is unique about Sue 
can help shed light on Hardy’s viewpoint.
Sue is almost recklessly unconventional, especially when it comes to her sense of 
empathy for others and the feelings of remorse that that sense can engender in her. Thus, 
when she first encounters Arabella and jealously insists Jude send her away, she goes out 
the very next day to meet with the woman whom she saw just hours before as her rival. 
As Hardy explains:
There was no limit to the strange and unnecessary penances which Sue 
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would meekly undertake when in a contrite mood, and this going to see all 
sorts of extraordinary persons whose relation to her was precisely of a 
kind that would have made other people shun them, was her instinct ever, 
so that the request [to see Arabella] did not surprise [Jude]. (281)
Hardy’s description of Sue suggests a very highly evolved sense of moral obligation to 
others, one that operates precisely according to the mechanism described by Darwin. Sue 
is dismissive of Arabella out of a basic, possessive instinct, only to repent later when she 
thinks of Arabella’s situation and resolve to do better in the future. This resolution is the 
victory of Sue's higher social instinct over her primal and possessive urges regarding 
Jude. What is unique about Sue is the free rein that this highly evolved sentiment has in 
affecting her actions. Part of the answer may lie in the other unique element of her 
character.
Sue herself suggests, early in her relationship with Jude, that her life “has been 
entirely shaped by what people call a peculiarity in [her]” (167):
I have no fear of men, as such, nor of their books. I have mixed with them 
- one or two of them particularly - almost as one of their own sex. I have 
not felt about them as most women are taught to feel - to be on their guard 
against attacks on their virtue. (167)
As a result, Sue has received an educational experience that would be denied many 
women. She recounts her time sharing a flat with an undergraduate with whom she had a 
strictly platonic relationship, during which time they would “go about together - on 
walking tours, reading tours, and things of that sort - like two men almost” (167). Sue 
credits many of her advanced ideas to her time with the young man.
Jude, every bit as lovesick in his pursuit of Sue as her unfortunate undergraduate 
came to be, expands on this. In the days before her first marriage to Phillotson, Jude 
wishes he “could only get over her sense of sex, as she seemed to be able to do so easily 
of it,” precisely because she could be a great “comrade” (173). Sue herself explains the 
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nature of her feelings for Jude when they are first living together, saying “My liking for 
you is not as some women’s perhaps. But it is a delight in being with you, of a supremely 
delicate kind” (255). Jude describes Sue as a “spirit,”  a “disembodied creature, ” and a 
“tantalizing phantom - hardly flesh at all!” (259). Later, when Sue insists that she has 
behaved like a fallen woman and that is why she is being punished by God, Jude asserts 
the opposite, calling attention to her near indifference to matters of sex:
Your natural instincts are perfectly healthy; not quite so impassioned, 
perhaps, as I could wish; but good, and dear, and pure. And as I have often 
said, you are absolutely the most ethereal, least sensual woman I ever 
knew to exist without inhuman sexlessness. (353)
Hardy himself elaborated on this aspect of Sue’s character in a letter quoted in his 
biography. Responding to a question from Edmund Gosse about the possibility that Sue’s 
muted sexuality might suggest homosexual tendencies, Hardy explains that
there is nothing perverted or depraved in Sue’s nature. The 
abnormalism[sic] consists in disproportion, not in inversion, her sexual 
instinct being healthy as far as it goes, but unusually weak and fastidious. 
Her sensibilities remain painfully alert notwithstanding, as they do in 
nature with such women. One point illustrating this I could not dwell 
upon: that, though she has children, her intimacies with Jude have never 
been more than occasional, even when they were living together (I 
mention that they occupy separate rooms, except towards the end), and 
one of her reasons for fearing the marriage ceremony is that she fears it 
would be breaking faith with Jude to withhold herself at pleasure, or 
altogether, after it; though while uncontracted she feels at liberty to yield 
herself as seldom as she chooses. (Later Years, 42)
In this way, Sue may be the polar opposite of the young Jude. Unencumbered by a 
strong sense of sexual desire, her internal Darwinian conflict is dominated by her well-
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informed reason and her acute sense of sympathy. Sue’s character suggests something 
more than the sexual restraint Angel Clare displays. Rather, she has an almost inhuman 
advantage in that certain instinctive drives are quieted to the point that her moral 
decision-making process is fundamentally different from those of Hardy’s other 
protagonists. Ominously for Sue, her apparent indifference to matters of sex also puts her 
in company with Diggory Venn, whom Hardy depicts as the only man on Egdon immune 
to the overwhelming charms of Eustacia Vye. Unlike Venn, whose peculiarities lead him 
to a detached and itinerant lifestyle, Sue chooses to remain a part of the society that she 
critiques, a decision that brings her into direct conflict with the existing value system that 
she has rejected and sets the stage for a dramatic Darwinian conflict. 
Seen in this light, the story of Jude Fawley, from his early ambitions to his 
dalliance with Arabella to his time in the city and the education he ultimately receives 
from Sue, is the story of a fundamental evolutionary turning-point. Indeed, it is the story 
of the central moment in both the Darwinian development of a higher morality and in 
Hardy’s own project of evolutionary meliorism - the moment when the selection of moral 
traits ceases to happen unconsciously and  begins to be controlled by a process of 
methodical selection. Sue’s near sexlessness suggests a sort of genetic mutation that gives 
freer rein to her reason and empathy, the two forces Darwin suggests are responsible for 
the improvement of morality.  
The ideas that Jude receives from Sue serve as the capstone to an educational 
program he had already begun, one which allows him to carefully approach his own 
morality, stripping away ideas grounded in superstition and custom that are ultimately 
unjust. When Sue becomes mired in religious mania, Jude continues, adding the lessons 
of his tragic experiences to the education he has already received. Moreover, Jude himself 
places the experience in the context of an intellectual journey from superstition and 
ignorance to a more rational view of the world, a journey which Sue is no longer able to 
navigate with him:
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One thing troubled [Jude] more than any other; that Sue and himself had 
mentally travelled in opposite directions since the tragedy; events which 
had enlarged his own views of life, laws, customs, and dogmas, had not 
operated in the same manner on Sue’s. She was no longer the same as in 
the independent days, when her intellect played like lambent lightning 
over conventions and formalities which he at that time respected, though 
he did not now. (353)
This aspect of Sue’s relationship with Jude is simply the latest iteration of the 
concept of moral mentorship with which Hardy had toyed throughout the tragic novels. 
Clym Yeobright dreams of serving as the mentor to the denizens of Egdon Heath, but he 
is limited by his own failures of perception and lack of self-awareness. Despite Angel 
Clare’s desire to avoid directly influencing her with his modern notions, Tess Durbeyfield 
ultimately absorbs many of his ideas, but only partially, in a way that she is later unable 
to pass on in her failed attempts to argue with Alec d’Urberville on the subject. In other 
words, it is the fatal flaws of Yeobright and Clare that keep them from successfully 
passing on their new ideas and ensuring the survival of a new moral system. In Sue and 
Jude, however, Hardy manages to return to the subject in a way that most highlights the 
danger presented by those in society who choose not to reflect on their own values and 
the effects that they have on others.
Sue is hardly without her faults. But, unlike Yeobright and Clare, she is not nearly 
so hampered by the legacy of old superstitions and customs, and as such is not prevented 
from effectively leading Jude down the path toward a more active engagement with his 
own morality. Indeed, under Sue’s tutelage, Jude reaches a point of moral and intellectual 
development that Angel Clare only approaches at the end of Tess, after his encounter with 
his own broad-minded mentor figure. Yeobright, arguably, never arrives at that point. 
Furthermore, both Sue and Jude accomplish this intellectual and moral development as 
members of the working class with little formal education.
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Jude and Sue’s material, academic, and professional disadvantages, in relation to 
Hardy’s earlier protagonists, serve to emphasize the notion that their moral and 
intellectual achievements are available to all who are willing to engage in a sympathetic, 
reasoned examination of their own values and their origins. By focusing less on the flaws 
of either mentor or student, Hardy draws the reader’s attention to those around Jude and 
Sue who refuse to question their own moral judgments or the influence they have on 
others. Jude himself emphasizes this role of society in one of the final scenes of the book, 
arguing that he and Sue were doomed to failure by the simple fact that they arrived at 
their ideas before the general public was ready to accept them:
As for Sue and me when we were at our own best, long ago - when our 
minds were clear, and our love of truth fearless - the time was not ripe for 
us! Our ideas were fifty years too soon to be any good to us. And so the 
resistance they met with brought reaction in her, and recklessness and ruin 
in me! (405)
Jude’s words serve as a challenge to the reader, one that Hardy refined throughout his 
career as tragedian. The time for bold acts of moral husbandry is coming, Hardy suggests, 
and in fifty years’ time, notions such as those of Jude and Sue will seem commonplace. 
For the reader, then, Hardy implies two options: joining in that process of carefully-
reasoned moral revision or joining in the “opposition” that brought Jude and Sue, and 
indeed all of Hardy’s protagonists to their tragic ends. 
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Chapter Three
The Dream of a New Reformation
'My whole instinct in matters of religion is towards reconstruction; to 
quote your favorite Epistle to the Hebrews, ‘the removing of those things 
that are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which cannot 
be shaken may remain’
-Angel Clare, Tess of the d’Urbervilles26
From The Return of the Native to Jude the Obscure, Hardy's work as a tragic 
novelist can be seen as an attempt to develop his method of engaging the reader in a 
discussion about the nature of morality and how it has evolved, a development that led 
him to increasingly dramatic and shocking subject matter in an attempt to sway the 
sympathies of the reader. The vehement and negative responses of many members of the 
reading public, meanwhile, suggest that Hardy woefully underestimated the obstacles that 
stood in the way of his project of evolutionary meliorism through fiction. This was a fatal 
flaw, as his method of applying Darwin’s ideas depended on the assumption that he and 
his reader were bound to draw the same conclusions about his protagonists and their 
struggles. Failing that, Hardy’s ideas certainly depended on the idea that readers would 
respond to the suffering of those protagonists with sympathy and understanding, an 
assumption that turned out to be a bridge too far for many of Hardy’s contemporaries.
Hardy’s personal writings, as well as the notes appended to the various editions of 
his novels, abound with shock and consternation at the disconnection between his own 
views and those of his readers. Perhaps the most overt example is the response to the 
subtitle of Tess (“A Pure Woman, Faithfully Presented”), which makes explicit his 
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assessment of Tess Durbeyfield's character. In his preface to the fifth edition of the novel, 
Hardy notes that the subtitle
was appended at the last moment, after reading the final proofs, as being 
the estimate left in a candid mind of the heroine’s character – an estimate 
that nobody would be likely to dispute. It was disputed more than anything 
else in the book. (29-30)
The outrage at the notion of Tess as “pure woman” was nothing compared to the response 
to Jude, which culminated in an oft-cited incident of an American clergyman burning the 
book and sending Hardy the ashes (Later Years, 39). In his introduction to later editions 
of the novel, as well as his correspondence with those who took a more favorable view of 
it, Hardy repeatedly expressed his frustration with the public response to Jude. In one 
letter, he noted that it was
curious that some of the papers should look upon the novel as a manifest 
on “the marriage question”(although, of course, it involves it), seeing that 
it is concerned first with the labours of a poor student to get a University 
degree, and secondly with the tragic issues of two bad marriages, owing in 
the main to a doom or curse of hereditary temperament peculiar to the 
family of the parties. The only remarks which can be said to bear on the 
general marriage question occur in dialogue, and comprise no more than 
half a dozen pages in a book of five hundred. (Later Years, 40)
In another letter, Hardy bemoaned the way readers focused on the most sensational 
elements of the book at the expense of the message which they were crafted to convey, 
arguing that 
102
the only point in the novel on which I feel sure is that it makes for 
morality; and that delicacy or indelicacy in a writer is according to his 
object. If I say to a lady “I met a naked woman,” it is indelicate. But if I go 
on to say “I found she was mad with sorrow,” it ceases to be indelicate. 
And in writing Jude my mind was fixed on the ending. (Later Years, 43)
The disconnection between Hardy and his readers on this point is best illuminated 
by a comment in the preface to the Wessex edition of the novel: “Artistic effort always 
pays heavily for finding its tragedies in the forced adaptation of human instincts to rusty 
and irksome moulds that do not fit them” (29). Hardy’s description of the central conflict 
of the novel is a succinct representation of the conflict at the heart of his entire project of 
evolutionary meliorism. Hardy's claim that Jude was only minimally about the question 
of marriage, despite the fact that the entire plot of the novel hinges on the issue, goes a 
long way to explain his perspective. Having spent decades developing his ideas, Hardy 
viewed it as obvious that social standards surrounding marriage in Jude were meant to be 
the opening through which he would entice readers into a discussion about moral 
evolution in general. Likewise, he saw it as unexceptional to suggest those ideas were so 
ubiquitous in contemporary fiction that the negative response to Jude was simply part of 
a larger trend of authors struggling to portray the evolutionary process. In hindsight, 
however, it is easy to see how the broader discussion was lost on many readers who were 
already scandalized by Hardy's arguments about marriage and sexuality.
In this way, it seems that Hardy himself fell victim to the problem which plagued 
Clym Yeobright in his attempts to educate the residents of Egdon Heath. Just as Yeobright 
“may have been called unfortunate” because “the rural world was not ripe for him,” 
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(Return, 190), Hardy seems to have labored under a similar delusion about the openness 
of the English reading public to the ideas that he expressed in his fiction. Perhaps this 
explains why Hardy, looking back on Return as he readied the Wessex editions of his 
work, remarked, “I got to like the character of Clym before I had done with him. I think 
he is the nicest of all my heroes and not a bit like me” (Later Years, 150). Hardy’s ironic 
tone suggests an all-too-sincere expression of his failure to acknowledge the gulf between 
his presumptions about Victorian society and reality. 
In hindsight, however, Hardy should have been able to anticipate that gulf from 
the time that he published Return, simply by gauging the response to one of the novel’s 
most enigmatic characters: the reddleman Diggory Venn. Venn is a peculiar character, one 
whose role in society has no real parallel within either Tess or Jude.  In many ways, he 
belongs among the ranks of Hardy’s morally advanced characters, along with Clym, 
Angel, Sue, and Jude. In this way, the changes that Hardy was forced to make to 
Diggory’s character for publication serve as indicators of the struggle that Hardy would 
have with the reading public throughout his career as a tragic novelist.
Diggory Venn exists in the world of Egdon Heath as a sort of man out of time. To 
many of the residents of the village, he is either a holdover from a previous era, a 
malevolent bogeyman with which to scare children, or both. The position of reddlemen in 
the social order is complicated by the fact that they see themselves very differently than 
others do. As Hardy observes early in the novel:
The reddleman lived as a gipsy, but gipsies he scorned. He was about as 
thriving as traveling basket and mat makers; but he had nothing to do with 
them. He was more decently born and brought up than the cattle-drovers 
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who passed and repassed him in his wanderings; but they merely nodded 
to him. His stock was more valuable than that of peddlers; but they did not 
think so, and passed his car with eyes straight ahead. He was such an 
unnatural colour to look at that the men of round-abouts and wax-work 
shows seemed gentlemen beside him; but he considered them low 
company, and remained aloof. Among all these squatters and folks of the 
road the reddleman continually found himself; yet he was not of them. His 
occupation tended to isolate him, and isolated he was mostly seen to be. 
(100-1)
What sets Venn apart from most reddlemen is the fact that he has chosen his profession in 
a deliberate attempt to flee society. In a passage that calls to mind the later description of 
Clym’s physical appearance, Hardy observes that
[t]he reddleman who had entered Egdon that afternoon was an instance of 
the pleasing being wasted to form the ground-work of the singular, when 
an ugly foundation would have done just as well for that purpose. The one 
point that was forbidding about this reddleman was his colour. Freed from 
that he would have been as agreeable a specimen of rustic manhood as one 
would often see. A keen observer might have been inclined to think, which 
was, indeed, partly the truth, that he had relinquished his proper station in 
life for want of interest in it. Moreover, after looking at him one would 
have hazarded the guess that good-nature, and an acuteness as extreme as 
it could be without verging on craft, formed the framework of his 
character. (101)
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Venn, in other words, displays all the caring, concern, and intelligence of Hardy’s other 
advanced characters, coupled with the same sort of indifference to social status.
At the same time, Venn’s disdain for the existing social order expresses itself in a 
resistance to the sort of sexual impulsiveness that threatens to overpower many of his 
fellow Egdonites. Likewise, Venn seems unconcerned with traditional notions of chivalry 
that govern the “acceptable” expression of interest between the sexes. These elements of 
Venn's character invite comparison to Sue Bridehead’s “noncorporeal” nature and can be 
most clearly seen when Diggory discovers that Eustacia Vye is the source of Damon 
Wildeve’s inconsistent behavior towards Thomasin:
He had determined upon the bold stroke of asking for an interview with 
Miss Vye – to attack her position as Thomasin’s rival either by art or by 
storm, showing therein, somewhat too conspicuously, the want of gallantry 
characteristic of a certain astute sort of men, from clowns to kings. The 
great Frederick making war on the beautiful Archduchess, Napoleon 
refusing terms to the beautiful Queen of Prussia were not more dead to 
difference of sex than the reddleman was, in his peculiar way, in planning 
the displacement of Eustacia. (109-10)
It is particularly telling that Diggory is immune to the effects of “differences of sex” 
when dealing with Eustacia, the woman whose “magical” powers of attraction are at the 
heart of Hardy’s argument about the way sexuality has been misapprehended over the 
centuries. Certainly the difference between Diggory and other men is not lost on Eustacia 
herself:
She seemed to feel, after a bare look at Diggory Venn, that the man had 
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come on a strange errand, and that he was not so mean as she had thought 
him; for her close approach did not cause him to writhe uneasily, or shift 
his feet, or show any of those little signs which escape an ingenuous rustic 
at the advent of the uncommon in womankind. (111)
It is equally important that Diggory achieves what other men cannot through his 
selfless love for Thomasin, specifically in an attempt to secure her marriage to a man 
other than himself. As he confesses to Eustacia in their interview, he would have 
preferred to marry Thomasin himself, but because she rejected him for another, he 
explains that “if she cannot be happy without him I will do my duty in helping her to get 
him, as a man ought” (169). Eustacia’s reaction to Diggory’s explanation of his motives is 
a testament to how out of place such selflessness is in the existing order of things:
Eustacia looked curiously at the singular man who spoke thus. What a 
strange sort of love, to be entirely free from that quality of selfishness 
which is frequently the chief constituent of the passion, and sometimes its 
only one! The reddleman’s disinterestedness was so well deserving of 
respect that it overshot respect by being barely comprehended; and she 
thought it almost absurd. (169)
As a result of these fundamental elements of his character, Diggory, like Sue, approaches 
decisions with a dramatically different moral calculus than those around him, including 
the advanced Clym Yeobright, who is blinded by the twin instinctive urges of sexual 
attraction and filial attachment. The contrast between the two men is most on display in 
an exchange between Venn and Yeobright shortly after the deaths of Wildeve and 
Eustacia. When Clym claims that Eustacia is “the second woman [he has] killed this 
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year,” Diggory is shocked, arguing that Yeobright “may as well say that the parents be the 
cause of a murder by the child, for without the parents the child would never have been 
begot” and suggesting that the most important thing is that Clym’s “aim has always been 
good” (377).
Diggory’s sentiment echoes the ultimate epiphany that Angel Clare experiences in
his travels abroad in Tess, specifically the notion that “[t]he beauty or ugliness of a 
character lay not only in its achievements, but in its aims and impulses; its true history 
lay, not among things done, but among things willed” (Tess, 363). The difference between 
Clym’s and Diggory’s understanding of the situation is important, particularly given 
Hardy’s explanation of Clym’s inability to view the matter rationally:
[Clym] did sometimes think he had been ill-used by fortune, so far as to 
say that to be born is a palpable dilemma, and that instead of men aiming 
to advance in life with glory they should calculate how to retreat out of it 
without shame. But that he and his had been sarcastically and pitilessly 
handled in having such irons thrust into their souls he did not maintain 
long. It is usually so, except with the sternest of men. Human beings, in 
their generous endeavor to construct a hypothesis that shall not degrade a 
First Cause, have always hesitated to conceive a dominant power of lower 
moral quality than their own; and even while they sit down and weep by 
the waters of Babylon, invent excuses for the oppression which prompts 
their tears. (382)
In other words, Yeobright falls victim to the same sort of logic that leads Sue to argue that 
she and Jude are punished by a vengeful God for a happiness that is immoral. Diggory’s 
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opposition to the argument places him in the company of Angel Clare at the very end of 
Tess, or of Sue before her religious conversion, in “the days when her intellect scintillated
like a star.”
Diggory’s relatively advanced position on the continuum of moral development 
is unsurprising when his entire story is taken into account. The son of a successful dairy 
farmer with a comfortable future ahead of him, Diggory abandons his life as a farmer 
after he falls in love with Thomasin and proposes marriage, only to be rejected largely 
because he is only a farmer and not, as Thomasin observed in a letter that Diggory still 
carries years later, “a professional man” (102). But, as Hardy points out, while the 
Egdonites may consider Diggory’s chosen profession a step down, he has actually 
managed very well for himself:
During the interval he had shifted his position even further from 
[Thomasin’s] than it had originally been, by adopting the reddle trade; 
though he was really in very good circumstances still. Indeed, seeing that 
his expenditure was only one-fourth of his income, he might have been 
called a prosperous man. (102)
Diggory’s favorable position is confirmed by Eustacia, the consummate judge of suitors. 
Having been informed by Wildeve that Venn could be a rival for Thomasin’s hand, 
Eustacia’s assessment of Diggory is that “[h]is figure was perfect, his face young and 
well outlined, his eye bright, his intelligence keen, and his position one which he could 
readily better if he chose” (166).
Diggory, like Clym Yeobright and Angel Clare, is marked by the peculiarity of 
choosing a profession that is perceived as below his status, even peculiar for one of his 
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social standing. But it is Hardy’s choice of professions for Venn that is particularly 
striking. In the novel, Hardy simply describes reddle as “the bright pigment so largely 
used by shepherds in preparing sheep for the fair,” adding, in a sinister tone, that it 
“spreads its lively hues over everything it lights on, and stamps unmistakably, as with the 
mark of Cain, any person who has handled it half an hour” (100). Without more context, 
this limited description of Diggory’s profession creates more questions than it answers. 
Further reading on the subject of reddle, or ruddle, however, reveals the importance of 
Diggory’s trade in understanding his relationship to Hardy’s project of evolutionary 
meliorism.
William Youatt, one of the experts on animal husbandry cited by Darwin in his 
discussions of scientific breeding, explores the uses of reddle in several of his books. In 
The Complete Grazier and Farmer’s and Cattle-Breeder’s Assistant, Youatt explains that 
“[a]fter sheep have been clipped it is usual to mark them with ruddle or other colouring 
matter…The same method may be employed with some to class them at future stages of 
their growth” (281). This system of marking, Youatt explains, is crucial to the process of 
developing a breed:
Where a pure as well as a mixed breed of sheep is reared on the farm it 
will become necessary in order to avoid mistakes to distinguish those of 
the first breed with a different mark from that employed for the sheep of 
the second. … This system might be still furthered and each sheep 
branded on the cheek with a number. A judicious breeder would then find 
it conducive to his interest to keep a register in which the number of each 
sheep might be marked and where also such observations  as relate to the 
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coupling and crossing of the breeds and experiments he may wish to try 
upon the animal should be carefully entered. A careful breeder who is 
solicitous to improve flocks will in such register notice the defects or other 
of his sheep, their respective states of health or disease, the nature of their 
wool, the profit they yield &c. It will thus be easy to ascertain what 
individuals it is proper to dispose of each year as well as those from which 
it will be advantageous to breed. At length, the object proposed will be 
obtained, namely the improvement of the different breeds and the deriving 
from them the greatest profit.” (281-2)
Simply put, the profession for which Diggory has abandoned conventional respectability 
(a move not unlike Clym or Angel abandoning urban success for rural simplicity) is one 
that is central to the process of scientific breeding and selection. This curious fact, along 
with all of the peculiarities of Venn’s personality and moral character, cement his position 
among the breeders of morality in Hardy’s work.27 Indeed, there is reason to argue that in 
some ways Venn is more developed than Clym himself in this area.
It is for this reason that the public response to Diggory’s story is so telling when it 
comes to Hardy’s relationship with his readers. While the novel ultimately included a 
happy ending for Venn, one in which he returns to “normal” life and social acceptability, 
marries Thomasin, and enjoys both the fruits of his own savings and his wife’s 
inheritance from the unfortunate Damon Wildeve, Hardy himself intended no such 
outcome for Diggory. As he explains in a footnote:
the original conception of the story did not design a marriage between 
Thomasin and Venn. He was to have retained his isolated and weird 
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character to the last, and to have disappeared mysteriously from the heath, 
nobody knowing whither – Thomasin remaining a widow. But certain 
circumstances of serial publication led to a change of intent. Readers can 
therefore choose between the endings, and those with an austere artistic 
code can assume the more consistent conclusion to be the true one. (396)
Given Venn’s similarity to Hardy’s other morally advanced characters, as well as his 
identification with the scientific breeding that was so central to the ideas of both Hardy 
and Darwin, it is easy to see how Hardy felt that his original plan for the novel included 
“the more consistent conclusion.” Diggory’s voluntary position at the margins of 
acceptable society is analogous to the space that Angel Clare and Tess’s sister are forced 
to occupy by the end of the Tess, or in which Jude and Sue find themselves when it is 
discovered that they are unmarried. By choosing to remain where he is, Diggory avoids 
the punishment that is meted out by society toward Hardy's other morally advanced 
characters. 
Hardy’s understanding of how Diggory’s position would be interpreted, however, 
depends on his mistaken assumption that the scientific agnosticism that formed the 
bedrock of his ideas was as much a given to his readers as it was to himself. Rather than 
nodding in agreement at his assertion that such an advanced character as Diggory could 
have no place in the mid-century rural setting of Return, Hardy’s audience was more 
prepared for a story that rewarded Diggory’s caring and patience with material and 
romantic success, a storyline that was more consistent with the plots of countless novels 
that had come before.28 
This misunderstanding of how his readers would respond to Diggory suggests 
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something more than a simple mistaken assumption about the reading public's interest in 
happy endings. The failure to accept Diggory on Hardy’s terms is a failure of the 
fundamental premise of Hardy’s project of evolutionary meliorism. Hardy assumed that 
his readers were, like himself, eagerly awaiting a scientifically-informed conversation 
about the way morality could be understood and improved, a conversation whose 
importance would trump traditional notions of narrative and aesthetics. Hardy approaches
this issue head-on in his description of Clym Yeobright as the forerunner of a new 
aesthetic standard, suggesting that in the future pensive men like Clym will be considered 
beautiful precisely because “[p]eople already feel that a man who lives without disturbing 
a curve of feature, or setting a mark of mental concern anywhere upon himself, is too far 
removed from modern perceptiveness to be a modern type” (185). In hindsight, however, 
it seems clear that Hardy was too willing to generalize, to project his own ideas and 
feelings onto the whole of society. While Hardy may have felt that the English people in 
general were ready to throw over traditional standards of beauty in favor of a new ideal 
based on thoughtfulness and an understanding of “the defects of natural laws, and…the 
quandary that man is in by their operation” (Return, 185), the response of many readers 
suggested otherwise.
The same disconnection between Hardy and his readers is evident in the response 
to the setting of his work and the way it is presented. Much has been made of Hardy’s 
decision to ground so many of his novels in the fictionalized rural landscape that he 
named Wessex. Certainly Hardy himself suggests that there is something profound about 
the nature of the Dorset countryside, something about the vast stretches of heath and 
pasture that would resonate with contemporary society in a way that would mirror their 
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appreciation of the thought-worn face of Clym Yeobright. While it is tempting to view 
Hardy’s obsession with the Dorset countryside as a matter of nostalgia or conservatism, 
Hardy himself attributed his appreciation of Wessex to a coming revolution in aesthetics 
and philosophy.29 
In the first chapter of Return, Hardy argues that “[h]aggard Egdon appealed to a 
subtler and scarcer instinct, to a more recently learnt emotion than that which responds to 
the sort of beauty called charming and fair” (34). Going so far as to compare the 
“dignity” and “majesty” of the heath to those of a prison, he goes on to suggest that in the 
near future Egdon Heath would be seen as an aesthetic ideal:
It is a question if the exclusive reign of this orthodox beauty is not 
approaching its last quarter. The new Vale of Tempe may be a gaunt waste 
in Thule; human souls may find themselves in closer and closer harmony 
with external things wearing a somberness distasteful to our race when it 
was young. The time seems near, if it has not actually arrived, when the 
chastened sublimity of a moor, a sea, or a mountain will be all of nature 
that is absolutely in keeping with the moods of the more thinking among 
mankind. (34)
With Modernism lurking just around the corner, there is a real prescience to 
Hardy’s argument that in due time the “more thinking among mankind” would find “a 
gaunt waste” to be “absolutely in keeping” with their mood. But for Hardy himself, the 
attempt to infuse his work with such an aesthetic was yet another source of friction 
between the writer and his readers. This is particularly true because Hardy, with his focus 
on the ameliorative value of scientific knowledge, was effusive in his use of scientific 
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jargon, a choice that he assumed would resonate with a reading public that was hungry 
for new ideas and scientific discussion. Far from appreciating the attention that Hardy 
lavished on biological and anthropological details in his descriptions of Wessex, however, 
many of his most vocal critics were particularly frustrated by the intrusion of scientific 
language on what they perceived as the familiar stormy moors and heaths of English 
literature. Richard le Galliene, reviewing Tess in The Star discussed
A defect in Mr. Hardy’s style which is continually making one grind one’s 
teeth, like “sand in honey.” One cannot call it euphemism, for euphemism 
tends to “favour and to prettiness.” It seems rather to come from sudden 
moments of self-consciousness in the midst of creative flow, as also from 
the imperfect digestion of certain modern science and philosophy, which is 
becoming somewhat too obtrusive through the apple-cheek outline of Mr. 
Hardy’s work. … Mr. Hardy continually delights in those long Latin and 
Greek words that seem to be made out of springs rather than vowels. 
Think how absolutely out of colour in Arcadia are such words as 
“dolorifuge,” “photosphere,” “heliolatries,” “arborescence,” 
“concatenation,” “noctambulist,” – where, indeed, are such in colour? – 
and Mr. Hardy further uses that horrid verb “ecstasise.” (Critical 
Heritage, 178-9)
Le Galliene’s objections suggest that at least some members of the reading public were 
not so ready as Hardy hoped to tear down the walls of the old Arcadia and erect a new 
ideal in their place. Andrew Lang, in a review in Longman’s Magazine, was even more 
succinct, suggesting that
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[i]f [a critic] be struck by such a defect of style as the use of semi-
scientific phraseology out of place, he must say so; he must point out the 
neighbourhood of the reef on which George Eliot was wrecking her 
English. (Critical Heritage, 242)
Such responses suggest the failure of Hardy’s most fundamental assumptions 
about the interest of the general public, and even many literary connoisseurs, in the ideas 
that informed his work.30 That failure would ultimately be the downfall of his project of 
evolutionary meliorism through tragic fiction. Although he continued to work with the 
same ideas throughout his career, ultimately producing some of the clearest elucidations 
of those ideas in verse (including The Dynasts), Hardy never returned to novel writing 
after Jude. In a letter written amidst the furor over Jude, he suggests that he hoped to be 
able to
express more fully in verse ideas and emotions which run counter to the 
inert crystallized opinion – hard as a rock – which the vast body of men 
have vested interests in supporting. To cry out in a passionate poem that 
(for instance) the Supreme Mover or Movers, the Prime Force or Forces, 
must be either limited in power, unknowing, or cruel – which is obvious 
enough, and has been for centuries – will cause them merely a shake of 
head; but to put it in  argumentative prose will make them sneer, or foam, 
and set all the literary contortionists jumping upon me, a harmless 
agnostic, as if I were a clamorous atheist, which in their crass illiteracy 
they seem to think is the same thing. (Later Years, 57-8)
This retreat from fiction, then, is also a retreat from a broader audience. Yet while Hardy 
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decries the “literary contortionists” who would twist his meaning, he still clings to the 
assertion that his ideas about theology are commonplace and have been for ages, despite 
the fact that his own experience with the reading public suggested that precisely the 
opposite was true.
At the same time, it is worth noting that despite Hardy's opposition to the 
supernatural element of Anglican theology, his intention was never to argue for the 
dissolution of the Church. Like Angel Clare, Hardy maintained a great fondness for the 
Church despite his inability to accept the Bible as literally true. His personal writings 
suggest that he envisioned a central role for the Church in the great age of moral 
husbandry that he imagined was approaching, if only the Church could be made to 
understand and adapt to what Hardy saw as a near universal disillusionment with the 
message that congregations received week after week. 
Shortly before the release of the third part of The Dynasts, Hardy made a series of 
notes in his diary about an article which he considered writing, entitled “The Hard Case 
of the Would-be Religious. By Sinceritas” (Later Years, 121). Hardy synopsizes the 
article in his notes with the observation that “[m]any millions of the most thoughtful 
people in England are prevented entering any church or chapel from year's end to year's 
end” (121) before going on to explain that the article would deal with the idea of religion 
“in its modern sense entirely, as being expressive of nobler feelings towards humanity 
and emotional goodness and greatness, the old meaning of the word – ceremony, or ritual 
– having perished, or nearly” (121).
Building on these basic principles, Hardy goes on to paint an image of his own 
understanding of the need for religious reform which neatly captures both his ideas about 
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religion and morality and his difficulties with the way society responded to those ideas:
We enter the church and we have to say, 'We have erred and strayed 
from Thy ways like lost sheep', when what we want to say is, 'Why are we 
made to err and stray like lost sheep?' Then we have to sing, 'My soul doth 
magnify the Lord', when what we want to sing is, 'O that my soul could 
find some Lord that it could magnify! Till it can, let us magnify good 
works, and develop all means of easing mortals' progress through a world 
not worthy of them.'
Still, being present, we say the established words full of the 
historic sentiment only, mentally adding, 'How happy our ancestors were 
in repeating in all sincerity these articles of faith!' But we perceive that 
none of the congregation recognizes that we repeat the words from an 
antiquarian interest in them, and in a historic sense, and solely in order to 
keep a church of some sort afoot – a thing indispensable; so that we are 
pretending what is not true: that we are believers. This must not be; we 
must leave. And if we do, we reluctantly go to the door, and creep out, as 
it creaks complaining behind us. (Later Years, 121-2)
This passage, written at a time when Hardy was uncertain about the future of a work that 
represented the most detailed, careful explication of his own ideas, is freighted with the 
disappointment and frustration that dogged Hardy throughout his career. Yet even at his 
most frustrated, Hardy maintains that the Church is “a thing indispensable” to modern 
society. Hardy's idea of the necessity of the Church underscores the fact that he saw the 
ideas of Darwin as a means of reforming the Church rather than obliterating it.
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In the “Apology” at the beginning of Late Lyrics and Earlier, Hardy asks the 
reader “what other purely English establishment than the Church, of sufficient dignity 
and footing, with such strength of old association, such scope for transmutability, such 
architectural spell, is left in this country to keep the shreds of morality together?” 
(Poems, 561). He continues, describing what “may indeed be a forlorn hope, a mere 
dream,”  the dream of
an alliance between religion, which must be retained unless the world is to 
perish, and complete rationality which must come also unless the world is 
to perish, by means of the interfusing effect of poetry - “the breath and 
finer spirit of all knowledge; the impassioned expression of science.” 
(561-2)
Hardy's argument suggests that he viewed himself and other scientific moralists 
as the heirs to the tradition of the Reformation and the great theological scholars, a notion 
that is reinforced by a passage in his biography:
His vision had often been that of so many people brought up under Church 
of England influences, a giving of liturgical form to modern ideas, and 
expressing them in the same old buildings that had already seen previous 
reforms successfully carried out. He would say to his friends, the Warden 
of Keble, Arthur Benson, and others, that if the bishops only had a little 
courage, and would modify the liturgy by dropping preternatural 
assumptions out of it, few churchgoers would object to the change for 
long, and congregations would be trebled in a brief time. (Later Years, 
176-7)
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 Lurking behind this optimistic vision of congregations all over England objecting 
only briefly to the sudden removal of all the articles of faith from their religion is a 
starry-eyed view of church reform that amounts to something like a willful blindness 
about both contemporary England and the history of the Church. Hardy fails to 
acknowledge the bitter struggle that was necessary for the “previous reforms successfully 
carried out,” implying instead that a far more dramatic revision of theology could be 
carried out in a short time with little difficulty, a fact that history has not been borne out 
in the century that has elapsed since Hardy penned that argument.
In many ways, however, Hardy's comparison of his own efforts to those of 
Reformation thinkers is apt, if in a somewhat different way than he originally intended. 
Luther, like Hardy, aimed at beginning a conversation within the Catholic Church, a 
conversation that would ultimately allow the Church to retain its position in the 
community while correcting what he viewed as substantial errors in its theology. And, 
like Luther, Hardy was destined to be disappointed in his lifetime as his ideas ultimately 
led to schism and struggle. For Hardy, the Twentieth Century did not bring the broad, 
democratic discussion of morality and its origins culminating in careful acts of moral 
husbandry that he envisioned. Rather, it brought the collapse of many of the oldest 
institutions in England and on the Continent, a decline in congregations, the rise of the 
sort of violent nationalism that he disparaged in Jude, and the shocking destruction of a 
World War in his lifetime. Hardy's biography notes that “the war destroyed all Hardy's 
belief in the gradual ennoblement of man, a belief he had held for many years...He said 
he would probably not have ended The Dynasts as he did end it if he could have foreseen 
what was going to happen within a few years.” (Later Years, 165)
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Despite this, however, Hardy continued to urge reform, both within and without 
the Church. Moreover, he eventually achieved a position within the literary world that 
gave some real weight to those urgings. As unlikely as it may have seemed to Hardy at 
the time that he was receiving the ashes of Jude in the mail, at the time of his death 
Hardy was considered one of the leading lights of English literature, numbering among 
his friends and acquaintances many of the greatest literary minds of his own generation 
and the generation to follow. His place in public opinion, far from its nadir at the end of 
his career as a novelist, is reflected by the fact that his pallbearers included not only 
literary colleagues but the heads of the major colleges and the prime minister himself. 
Hardy's work has continued to be a staple wherever English literature is taught, at the 
university and even high school level, a fact which has kept the discussion of all his 
protagonists and their struggles alive more than a century after they were first introduced.
And, just as Jude's claim that his and Sue's ideas “were fifty years too soon to be 
any good to us” (405) appears prescient in hindsight to many readers, much of what 
Hardy predicted has come to pass, or very nearly. By the time of his death in 1928, a 
revolution in aesthetics and literary style was certainly taking place, one which would 
bear out his prediction in Return that “[t]he new Vale of Tempe” might be “a gaunt waste 
in Thule” (34).31 Most notable, however, is the fact that the work of moral husbandry that 
Hardy envisioned has begun to take place outside of the church.  The work of 
sociobiologists such as E.O. Wilson has brought new scientific scrutiny to bear on the 
idea of the internal struggle between instinct and learned behavior posited by Darwin. At 
the intersection of science and philosophy, thinkers such as Dawkins, Dennett, and 
Hofstader have popularized the discussion of the evolution of cultural products and the 
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exploration of their origins. On campuses throughout the world, the dissection of gender 
roles, social structures, religion and morality has become one of the primary tools used in 
the study of art and literature, a development that has perhaps done more than anything to 
democratize the conversation that Hardy once hoped would take place among the novel-
reading public. And while it hardly seems likely that such conversations will lead to the 
sort of near-immediate results Darwin at which marveled in discussing the prowess of the 
eminent breeders of his time, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that Hardy might see in 
contemporary academic, philosophical, and scientific discussion something of the 




2 Phillip Mallet's “Hardy, Darwin, and The Origin of Species” delves into many of the 
specifics of Origin, including the role of instinct in morality, but engages only 
minimally with the novels. Mallet overlooks the crucial transition from unconscious to 
conscious selection, and his focus on Origin precludes engagement with the extensive 
discussions of morality in Descent.
3 The lines quoted by Hardy in the passage come from Wordsworth's Intimations Ode, a 
choice choice which highlights the optimistic nature of Hardy's intention in the 
“Apology.” Hardy's philosophical progress from the bleak disillusionment of “Hap” to 
the more optimistic embrace of the ameliorative potential of Darwin's ideas squares 
nicely with the optimistic resolution of Wordsworth's poem, in which the author 
expresses the hope that people could find cause for hope “[i]n the primal sympathy / 
Which having been must ever be” and “[i]n the soothing thoughts that spring / Out of 
human suffering.”
4 Sumpter's argument echoes those of other critics who seize on Hardy's affinity for 
scientific ideas while attempting to separate them from his philosophical views. 
DeWitt, for instance, argues that Hardy sees the “human” and “scientific” views of the 
world as fundamentally incompatible.  
5  Mallett focuses on this idea of successive variation, particularly in connection with 
the idea of individuals becoming adapted to their location, arguing that this is visible 
in Diggory Venn's adaptation to Egdon Heath and the way that Tess's sister comes to 
occupy a place that Tess herself could not.
6 Caminero-Santangelo, who also focuses on the influence of Huxley, arrives at similar 
conclusions. Like Hyman and myself, he sees Hardy as concerned with the ability of 
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each individual to participate in a broad, democratic discussion of ethical principles. In 
this discussion, he argues, Hardy “bases ethics on a human consciousness with an 
awareness of those structures of society and nature which contribute to human misery 
and misfortune”(60). Lacking the overarching narrative provided by Darwin, 
Caminero-Santangelo concludes that Hardy “does not seem to believe that 
science...could offer valid possibilities for ethical progressive action”(60).
7 Poems, 168.
8 Jude, 172.
9 Joan Durbeyfield's outdated beliefs have been explored by a number of critics. Eakins' 
discussion of the pagan tradition in Tess is particularly insightful. More recently, John 
Rodden has drawn attention to similarities between the ways that Joan Durbeyfield 
and the Reverend James Clare are described, suggesting that both figures occupy 
childlike roles at the opposite ends of a spectrum between religion and nature(304). 
Rodden connects this observation to Ian Gregor's notion of Hardy's fiction as a “Great 
Web,” arguing that both are strands of the same web of belief. For the purpose of my 
argument, I would take this further, suggesting that the similarities between 
Durbeyfield and Clare arise from the fact that both parents are designed to 
demonstrate the Darwinian principle of early education forming a sort of acquired 
instinct. Angel explicitly states that his notion of purity comes from his father, just as 
Tess has, since her time in the cradle, absorbed her mother's teachings on the subject, 
exemplified by the ballad of the gown “That never would become that wife That had 
once done amiss”(213)
10 In relation to the other characters in the novel, Diggory has been sparsely treated. 
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Hagan focuses on Diggory's diabolical appearance and reduces him, at best, to an ill-
informed meddler. Sandy Cohen focuses on the relationship between Clym and 
Diggory but overlooks many of their similarities as well as the significance of 
Diggory's choice of professions.
11 William Cohen, Graeme Tytler, and Alexandra Farrell all explore the issues of 
physiognomy in Hardy's novels, particularly Return. Tytler and Farrell both provide 
insights in terms of the influence of Darwin's Expression of Emotions in Man and 
Animals on Hardy's depiction of his characters' appearances. 
12  Sue's method of altering her Bible to be read “in chronological order” suggests a more 
anthropological interest in Christianity as a cultural product that evolved over time, a 
pursuit that reflects the other anthropological influences on both Darwin and Hardy 
himself.  
13 See Zeitler on Hardy's interest in anthropology and his connection to contemporary 
experts in the field. 
14 See Ferguson on the political significance of Bonfire Night in Hardy's time.
15 See Rutland, Schweik, and Tomalin on Hardy's sources for these ideas. Rutland offers 
one of the earliest readings of the influence of Strauss based on an analysis of Hardy's 
own copy of Das Leben Jesu, while Schweik and Tomalin discuss the influence of 
Feuerbach's ideas.
16 Both Malton and Ramel explore the relationship between sexuality and accusations of 
witchcraft, although both seem to ascribe to Hardy views of the characters who pass 
judgment on Eustacia as a “witch.”  Ramel goes further, linking social punishment of 
Tess with the punishment of Eustacia, arguing that both women are punished for “an 
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enjoyment which is somewhat in excess of what the community considers 
acceptable”(65). 
17 Schoenfeld advances the interesting argument that Eustacia “was a sexually 
experienced woman,” a choice that Hardy made in an attempt “to show that sexuality 
for women should be as acceptable for women as it was for men”(194-5). This is 
particularly relevant given his later depictions of women who are punished for 
expressing sexual desire.
18 The question of whether Tess's initial encounter with d'Urberville or her subsequent 
time with d'Urberville at The Slopes represent a seduction or a rape has been a matter 
of much critical conjecture. Davis notes that the apparent ambiguity (or perhaps the 
dual nature of Tess's experiences with d'Urberville) serve to challenge the reader's 
notions about the nature of purity. Schoenfeld further connects Tess's experiences to 
those of Eustacia Vye, suggesting that Eustacia “was a sexually experienced woman,” 
and arguing that the stories of both Eustacia and Tess were part of “Hardy's attempts to 
show that sexuality for women should be as acceptable as it was for men”(194-5). 
Parker's reading of the subject focuses on the connection between the story of Tess's 
seduction and murder and rural values systems of ballads that involved the same plot. 
While Parker sees this connection as muddying the waters of Hardy's argument, I 
would suggest that it is simply part of a larger attempt to incorporate the anthropology 
of rural England into his arguments about the origins of morality. 
19 Schoenfeld provides a fascinating contextualization of the “shiftlessness” of the 
Durbeyfield family and contemporary developments in land ownership, economics, 
etc. 
20 See Ponsford on Hardy's use of “narrative response”(489) to weigh in on behalf of his 
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protagonists, particularly Tess.
21 See Fischler on the imagery of gins, traps, and springes in Hardy's novels and their 
connection to social conventions.
22 See Heffernan on Alec d'Urberville's exploitation of social standards regarding female 
purity and the implications for Hardy's argument about those standards (10).
23 Giordano emphasizes the role of tragedy in generating sympathy, arguing that 
“[s]uffering and suicide are transmuted in [Hardy's] works to enforce a saving 
sympathy”(184).
24  See Tomalin on Hardy's own experience with his first marriage and the possibility that 
he had been “trapped' by Emma. As Tomalin argues, Hardy's poetry about Emma 
suggests an experience that led him to be much more deeply conflicted than Jude is 
about his marriage to Arabella. 
25 There is a wealth of critical material dealing with the idea of Sue as “New Woman,” 
proto-feminist, etc., beginning especially in the late 1970s. Blake, Cockshut, and 
Fernando all make strong cases about the nature of Sue's feminism and Hardy's 
position on the issues. More recently, William Deresiewicz, in his discussion of 
Hardy's portrayal of friendship between men and women, makes several interesting 
observations about the connection between Sue's physical and emotional states. 
Drawing on Hardy's description in the postscript of Sue as an “emancipated bundle of 
nerves”(468) of the sort produced by modern ideas, Deresiewicz argues that Sue “is a 
'bundle of nerves' because she is emancipated. Her physical desires pull her in one 
direction, her intellectual and social desires in another”(60). While this argument 
dovetails nicely with the Darwinian notion of internal moral conflict between base 
instincts and reason, Deresiewicz instead argues that Sue's nervous energy comes from 
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“the conflict between a determining Darwinism and a doomed idealism with which 
Hardy opposes it”(60), ultimately giving in to a reductionist reading of Darwin by 
suggesting that “[i]f Hardy's name for the morality of Darwinism is 'business,' his 
name for the morality that opposes it is 'loving-kindness'”(61), an argument that 
overlooks the central role of altruism in Darwin's ideas about morality.
26 Tess, 144.
27 In this way, Diggory is one of a line of sympathetic protagonists marked by their 
connection to plant and animal husbandry. Gabriel Oak, the long-shunned shepherd of 
Far from the Madding Crowd, is pictured as spending his nights re-reading manuals of 
animal husbandry. Donald Farfrae, the romantic interest in Mayor of Casterbridge, is 
the impetus for the introduction of modern machinery and other methods of more 
scientifically-informed plant husbandry. Oak, with his long-suffering love for 
Bathsheba Everdene, suggests an earlier, more conservative version of Diggory Venn, 
while Farfrae's character combines many of the features of both Diggory Venn and 
Clym Yeobright, including Yeobright's blindness to the effects of his attraction to the 
female protagonist of the novel. 
28 Franke offers a fascinating reading of the challenges of serial publication and Hardy's 
attempt to turn those challenges to his advantage in the publication of Tess.
29 Sorum seizes on this idea in a discussion of Hardy's Wessex, arguing that the Wessex 
landscape is carefully crafted to help create a sense of empathy with his protagonists. 
Likewise, Keen draws on the work of Nineteenth-Century German Aesthetics to 
suggest that Hardy builds empathy for his characters through his description of the 
inanimate objects that surround them. Keen's ideas are of particular interest because of 
the connection he draws between empathy and altruism.
30 See Richards on the subject of contemporary critical response to Hardy's figurative 
language and recent attempts to re-evaluate what his detractors perceived as 
deficiencies. 
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